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Dunn: Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals

NOTES AND COMMENTS
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES:
A CRITICAL STUDY WITH PROPOSALS

FOR REFORM*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The basic consideration in every judicial establishment is
the caliber of its personnel. The law as administered cannot be
better than the judge who expounds it ....
We need judges learned in the law, not merely the law in
books but, something far more difficult to acquire, the law as
applied in action in the courtroom; judges deeply versed in the
mysteries of human nature and adept in the discovery of the
truth in the discordant testimony of fallible human beings;
judges beholden to no man, independent and honest
and-equally important-believed by all men to be independent and honest; judges, above all, fired with consuming zeal to
mete out justice according to law to every man, woman, and
child that may come before them and to preserve individual
freedom against any aggression of government; judges with the
humility born of wisdom, patient and untiring in the search for
truth and keenly conscious of the evils arising in a workaday
world from any unnecessary delay. Judges with all of these attributes are not easy to find, but which of these traits dare we
eliminate if we are to hope for evenhanded justice? Such ideal
judges can after a fashion make even an inadequate system of
substantive law achieve justice; on the other hand, judges who
lack these qualifications will defeat the best system of substantive and procedural law imaginable.'
The American system of justice is often praised for being
built on a foundation of laws, not individuals.2 The opposite,
* The author gratefully acknowledges Virginia V. Dunn and Pamela A. Sullivan for
their important contributions to this article; the Leona M. Hickman Fund, administered

by the Peoples National Bank of Washington, for financing the project; and the staffs of
the University of Washington Law Library, the American Judicature Society, and the
Institute of Judicial Administration for their cooperation in researching this article and
for the use of their facilities.
1. A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 11-12 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952)
(Jackson, J.); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (Miller, J.); 1 COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 43 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay ed. 1894); PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN

F.

KENNEDY,
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however, is more often the case. Most studied observers agree
that the individual judge-"warts and all"-stands at the center
of the judicial constellation and is its controlling force.3 "In the
long run," Justice Benjamin Cardozo once wrote, "'[t]here is no
guarantee of justice

. . .

except the personality of the judge.'

"4

Or, as Professor Robert Leflar expressed it, "[t]he quality of our
judges is the quality of our justice."'
For most of this country's 200 years, with some conspicuous
exceptions,6 the judicial system has been the recipient of consistent acclaim for its ability to resolve conflicts within the society
efficiently and fairly. 7 Recently, however, there has been increas3. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 307-08 (1947)(Frankfurter,
J.); ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.20 COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT JUDGES (1974); Jones, The Trial
Judge-Role Analysis and Profile, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION
124 (H. Jones ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Jones]; THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961)(A. Hamilton); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 146 (1967);
W.H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 78 (2d ed. 1925); Mott, Albright &
Semmerling, Judicial Personnel, 167 ANNALS 143 (1933); Rosenberg, The Qualities of
Justices-Are They Strainable?,44 TEXAS L. REV. 1063 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rosen-

bergi.
4. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16-17 (1921), quoting Ehrlich,
JudicialFreedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
SERIES 65 (1917). This book by Cardozo was adapted from his William L. Storrs Lecture
Series in 1921 at the Law School of Yale University at New Haven, Connecticut. Eugen
Ehrlich was a Professor of Roman Law at the University of Czernowitz, and the 1917
article was a translation by Ernest Bruncken (omitting the first six pages) of Ehrlich's

Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft, Leipzig, 1903. See also B. CARDOZO,
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 56-80 (1924); Jones, supra note 3, at 124; B. SHIENTAG, THE
PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE (1944).

5. Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 305 (1960).
6. See, e.g., Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Pound]. See note 53 infra and
accompanying text. For a more recent criticism of the administration of justice see L.
Nader & L. Singer, Dispute Resolution in the Future: What Are the Choices?, Sept. 1975
(paper delivered before the California State Bar Association).
7. See, e.g., H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 217-18 (1960) (the summation of Atticus
Finch):
One more thing, gentlemen, before I quit. Thomas Jefferson once said that
all men are created equal . . . [but] [w]e know all men are not created equal
in the sense some people would have us believe-some people are smarter than
others, some people have more opportunity because they're born with it, some
men make more money than others, some ladies make better cakes than others-some people are born gifted beyond the normal scope of most men.
But there is one way in this country in which all men are created
equal-there is one human institution that makes a pauper the equal of a
Rockefeller, the stupid man the equal of an Einstein, and the ignorant man the
equal of any college president. That institution, gentlemen, is a court. It can be
the Supreme Court of the United States or the humblest J. P. court in the land
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ing concern about the administration of justice with much of the
criticism centered on the performance of judges themselves., Although there undoubtedly are many highly qualified judges currently sitting, the record of judicial inadequacy and abuse is well
enough established to raise the fundamental question: how can
the quality of these most powerful and indispensable individuals
be improved?
There are a variety of elements which contribute to the quality of judges presently on the bench9 and there are procedures for
removing those who do not meet prescribed standards, but, as
Roscoe Pound has written, "[t]oo much thought has been given
to the matter of getting less qualified judges off the bench. The
real remedy is not to put them on."'" The problem of judicial
selection is an issue which deserves far more analysis than it has
heretofore received. It is, therefore, to this critical questionspecifically judicial selection in the states-that this article is
directed."
.... Our courts have their faults, as does any human institution, but in this
country our courts are the great levelers, and in our courts all men are created
equal.
8.See C. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy (1973); D. JACKSON, JUDGES
(1974); J. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974); D. STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES
(1974); Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qualifications:An Attempt To Deal With
JudicialMisconduct, 3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 244, 245-50 (1969); Chapin, FloridaScandals
May TriggerReforms, 59-JUDICATURE 47 (1975); Kaminsky, JudicialSelection: Alternative
to the Status Quo in the Selection of State Court Judges, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 496, 51314 (1974); Newfield, Judge Corso and the Mafia, The Village Voice, Oct. 12, 1972, at 1,
col. 3; Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges in New York, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 1972,
at 32; Newfield, Seven Suspicious Cases, The Village Voice, Nov. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1;
Newfield, The Next Ten Worst Judges,The Village Voice, Sept. 26, 1974, at 5, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1974, at 16, col. 3; THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
THE FIRST REPORT 13-17 (Oct. 1975) (report of the Governor, the Legislature, and the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York); Pound, supra note 6,
at 415; Van Osdol, Politicsand JudicialSelection, 28 ALA. LAW. 167, 168-70 (1967); Note,
JudicialSelection in New York: A Need for a Change, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 605, 608-14
(1975). See also G. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912).
9. Among the factors which an individual might consider before seeking or accepting
a judgeship are the tenure and removal procedures, retirement regulations, staff allotment, administrative duties, the status of the particular court, and perhaps of greatest
importance, the salary.
10. Pound, Introductionto E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES at xiv (1944)
[hereinafter cited as HAYNES]. Evan Haynes was a Professor of Law at the University of
California and wrote this book as part of the Judicial Administration Series for the National Conference of Judicial Councils of which Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard was
Director and Arthur T. Vanderbilt was Chairman of the Executive Committee. The book
contains a most valuable compendium of the constitutional and statutory history of judicial selection in the states from 1776-1944, at 101-35.
11. For material on the general subject of judicial selection see F. KLEIN, JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY 173-204 (1963); S. EScOvITZ,
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EVALUATIVE CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION

An inquiry into the complex problem of judicial selection
necessarily involves a delineation of those qualities which are
essential in a good judge as well as the establishment of certain
criteria by which to assess the efficacy of the different judicial
selection systems. While many students of jurisprudence have
touched upon the issue of judicial competence, 2 there have been
JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 48-58 (1975) (report issued by the American Judicature

Society).
The procedure for federal judicial selection has been fairly well-established since
1787. During the Constitutional Convention of that year there was sharp debate over the
method of choosing federal judges. It was not until the final sessions of the Conventionwhen the general issue of federal appointments was settled in favor of presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate-that the more specific problem of federal
judicial selection was resolved. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM

1-6 (2d ed. 1973); 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

169, 183, 498-99, 538-40 (M. Farrand ed. 1937); C.
CONSTITUTION

WARREN,

1787, at 132, 155,

THE MAKING

OF THE

639-42 (2d ed. 1937).

In 1891 the Congress provided specifically "that there shall be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in each circuit an additional circuit judge . . . ." Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 1, 26 Stat. 826;
Chase, FederalJudges: The Appointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (1966). The
law was recodified in 1948 to provide explicitly for the first time that all federal judges be
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the law has remained that way
up to the present. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (1970); Chase, 51 MINN. L. REV., supra, at 186-87
(1966). Although the basic procedure of selection has remained the same, there has been
much written about the applicable statutes and the discretionary procedures followed by
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1974); R. BURKE, THE PATH
TO TII COURT: A STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (1958); H. CHASE, FEDERAL
JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972); D. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS
APPOINTED (1964); J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 21-74 (1974); J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS
AND JUDGE.S: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965); J. HARRIS, THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (1953); S. ROSENBLATT, JUSTICE DENIED 259-75 (1971);
H. Cummings, Reorganizationof Federal Judiciary,81 APPENDIX TO THE CONG. REC., pt.

the President and the Senate. See generally H.

9, 604-07 (Statement by Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States, at a
Hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 10, 1937); Goldman, Judicial
Appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 186; Kaminsky,
supra note 8, at 516-17; Niles, The Changing Politicsof JudicialSelection: A Merit Plan
for New York, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242, 245-47 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Niles];
Scott, The Selection of FederalJudges, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205 (1967); Segal, Federal
Judicial Selection: Progress and the Promise of the Future, 46 MASS. L.Q. 138 (1961);
Voorhees, It's Time for Merit Selection of Supreme CourtJustices, 61 A.B.A.J. 705 (1975).
12. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, § 1.20 COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT JUDGES (1974);
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY. HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 25-104 (D. Carroll ed. 1961); L.
EMERY, CONCERNING JUSTICE

121-45 (1914);

JUSTICE IN THE STATES

166-88 (W. Swindler ed.

1971) (Addresses and Papers of the National Conference on the Judiciary, March 11-14,
1971, Williamsburg, Virginia); HAYNES, supra note 10; R. LOWE, RESOURCE MATERIAL FOR

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3
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too few rigorous efforts to isolate or specify certain qualifications
which might be required of judicial candidates and to set some
standard by which it is possible to "judge the judge."'1 3 Similarly,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 26-36 (1974) (published by the
American Judicature Society) [hereinafter cited as LowE]; B. POLLIT, JUSTICE AND THE
JUSTICES 16-27 (1954); B. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE (1944); Jones, supra

note 3; Singer, Kenyon & Korn, Toward Better Judges 10-13 (1961) (Citizens Union
Research Foundation, New York City); Judicial Nominating Commission, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Personal Data Questionnaire: Judgeships, March 15, 1975; Judicial Nominating Commission, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Criteria for Evaluating
Candidates, Mar. 15, 1975; Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931);
Goldman, American Judges: Their Selection, Tenure, Variety and Quality, 61 CURRENT
HISTORY 1, 6, 8, 50, 51 (1971); Mott, Albright & Semmerling, Judicial Personnel, 167
ANNALS 143 (1933); Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36
S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 9-12 (1962); Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SrrON HALL L.
REV. 721, 743-45 (1974).
13. See A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATINC.PROCESS 60-69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ASHMAN & ALFINI]; R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 272-308 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WATSON
& DOWNING]; Rosenberg, supra note 3. See also Morris, How Lawyers Judge the Judges,

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 1; note 101 infra; notes 114 & 121 infra
and accompanying text.
Professor Rosenberg believed that if any group could claim to be experts on the
judicial character it would be the judges themselves. He therefore submitted questionnaires to 144 judges, some of whom were attending the 1965 summer session of the National College of State Trial Judges in Boulder, Colorado, and others of whom were
attending the August 1965 annual meeting of the National Conference of State Trial
Judges in Miami Beach, Florida. Rosenberg found that the two groups reported nearly
identical views, and he suggested in his study that these opinions fairly well represent the
more than 3,000 judges who preside over major state trial courts in the country. In one
question the judges were asked, "What qualities best equip a lawyer to become a trial
judge?" To respond, the judges were asked to rate the following 23 qualities in what they
personally felt to be their order of importance:
-Some trial experience
-Good health, physical and mental
-As a lawyer, worked long hours (i.e., industrious)
-Punctual
-Professional and neat personal appearance
-Experience in supervising subordinates
-Decisive, not dilatory
-Active in civic, community affairs
-Knowledge of community and resources

-Patient: able to listen with mouth closed, mind open
-Sense of humor
-Well above average law school record
-Above average reputation for professional ability
-Earning, or likely to earn, more than the office pays
-Aura of dignity
-Possessed of moral courage
-Less than 60 years of age
-Consideration for others
-Dedicated to trial bench as lifetime job

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976
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there have been few disciplined studies of the various processes
by which judges are designated. An effective analysis of judicial
selection, however, demands the establishment of just such evaluative criteria. Not until the "who" and the "how" of judicial
selection are critically considered and not until it is recognized
that the quality of judges is intrinsically related to the way in
which they are chosen, can responsible conclusions be drawn and
practical reforms offered.
The personal and individualistic role which the judge plays
in our society invites subjective, and therefore divergent opinions
as to what exact attributes a judge should or should not have.
Socrates, for example, maintained that a good judge should
"hear courteously, answer wisely, consider soberly, and decide
impartially."" In the 17th century, the British judge Sir Matthew
Hale prepared for himself the following set of judicial guidelines
which the biographer Lord, Campbell has suggested should be
"inscribed in letters of gold on the walls of Westminster Hall":' 5
Things necessary to be continually had in remembrance.
1. That in the administration of justice, I am intrusted for
God, the King and country; and therefore,
2. That it be done, 1. uprightly; 2. deliberately; 3. resolutely.
-Past honorable partisan political activity
-Active in professional associations and work
-Reputation for fairness, uprightness
-Family situation
Most highly rated, in the following order, were:
(1) Moral courage
(2) Decisiveness
(3) Reputation for fairness and uprightness
(4) Patience
(5) Good health, physical and mental
(6) Consideration for others
Those qualities rated least important, in the following order, were:
(23) Past honorable partisan political activity
(22) Higher earnings in practice than as a judge"
(21) Active in civic and community affairs
(20)

Experience in supervision of subordinates

(19) Well above average law school record
(18) Active in professional associations and work
It is noteworthy that the trial judges gave the highest ratings to the more subjective
personality characteristics, whereas they gave their lowest scores to the more quantitative
criteria. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1066-69.
14. Schroeder & Hall, Twenty-Five Years' Experience with Merit Selection in
Missouri, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1088, 1089 (1966) (paraphrasingSocrates).
15. 1 J. CAMPBELL, THE LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 547 (1849).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3
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3. That I rest not upon my own understanding or strength,
but implore and rest upon the direction and strength of God.
4. That in the execution of justice I carefully lay aside my
own passions, and not give way to them, however provoked.
5. That I be wholly intent upon the business I am about,
remitting all other cares and thoughts as unseasonable and interruptions.
6. That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any
judgment at all, till the whole business and both parties be
heard.
7. That I never engage myself in the beginning of any
cause, but reserve myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard.
8. That in business capital, though my nature prompt me
to pity, yet to consider, there is also a pity due to the country.
9. That I be not too rigid in matters purely conscientious,
where all the harm is diversity of judgment.
10. That I be not biassed with compassion to the poor, or
favour to the rich, in point of justice.
11. That popular, or court applause, or distaste have no
influence into anything I do, in point of distribution of justice.
12. Not to be solicitous what men will say or think, so long
as I keep myself exactly according to the rules of justice.
13. If in criminals it be a measuring cast, to incline to
mercy and acquittal.
14. In criminals that consist merely in words, when no
more harm ensues, moderation is no injustice.
15. In criminals of blood, if the fact be evident, severity
is justice.
16. To abhor all private solicitations, of what kind soever,
and by whomsoever, in matters depending.
17. To charge my servants, 1. Not to interpose in any business whatsoever; 2. Not to take more than their known fees; 3.
Not to give any undue precedence to causes; 4. Not to recommend counsel.
18. To be short and sparing at meals, that I may be the
fitter for business.'"
16. G. BURNmEr, LIFE AND DEATH OF SIR MATTHEW HALE 35-36 (1682). See also BACON,
Speech to Justice Hutton in 6 THE WORKS OF FRANcis BACON 201-02 (Spenning ed. 1872).
Bacon, it will be remembered, had some difficulty with tenet nine himself:

To represent unto you the lines and portraitures of a good judge:
1. The first is, that you should draw your learning out of your books, not
out of your brain.

2. That you should mix well the freedom of your own opinion with the
reverence of the opinion of your fellows.
3.

That you should continue the studying of your books, and not to spend

on up on the old stock.
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More recently, the late Chief Justice of New Jersey, Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, argued that there were three "essentials" which
should be prominent in any definition of a true judge-impartiality, independence, and immunity.' 7 Vanderbilt explained
that: 8
[An] essential of a sound judicial system is, of course, a corps
of judges, each of them utterly independent and beholden only
to the law and to the Constitution, thoroughly grounded in his
knowledge of the law and of human nature including its political
manifestations, experienced at the bar in either trial or appellate work and preferably in both, of such a temperament that
he can hear both sides of a case before making up his mind,
devoted to the law and justice, industrious, and, above all, honest and believed to be honest.
Despite the lack of a firm consensus, certain fundamental
qualifications appear consistently throughout and are common to
these and most other assessments of the judicial character: (1) a
thorough working knowledge of the law; (2) impartiality; (3) decisiveness; (4) independence of action; (5) honesty, fairness, and
moral courage as well as the capacity to project an honest, fair,
and morally courageous image; and (6) an ability to relate positively to people in general-that is, the ability to encourage a
mutual trust between those who sit on the bench and those who
may appear before it. These six basic characteristics are the stan4.

That you should fear no man's face, and yet not turn stoutness into

bravery.
5. That you should be truly impartial, and not so as men may see affection
through fine carriage.
6. That you should be a light to jurors to open their eyes, but not a guide

to lead them by the noses.
7.

That you affect not the opinion of pregnancy and expedition by an

impatient and catching hearing of the counsellors at the bar.
8. That your speech be with gravity, as one of the sages of the law; and
not talkative, nor with impertinent flying out to shew learning.
9. That your hands, and the hands of your hands (I mean those about you)
be clean, and uncorrupt from gifts, from meddling in titles, and from serving of

turns, be they of great ones or small ones.
10. That you contain the jurisdiction of the court within the ancient merestones, without removing the mark.
11. Lastly, That you carry such a hand over your ministers and clerks, as
that they may rather be in awe of you, than presume upon you.
17. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualificationsand Selection, 36
B.U.L. REV. 1, 19 (1956).

18. Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 3
(1953).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3
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dards to which the judicial character will be held accountable in
this article when considering the different ways in which judges
are chosen.
The controversy over the selection of judges has been subject
to even less exacting scrutiny than the judicial character. As a
result, too little time and effort have been expended on devising
standards by which to appraise judicial selection systems. Fortunately, former New York University Law School Dean, Russell
D. Niles, developed a useful set of criteria, making just such an
assessment possible. Dean Niles wrote that any group charged
with selecting judges should: 9
1. Know what abilities and qualities are essential to a good
judge.
2. Have the means of finding the facts about candidates.
3. Exercise comparative judgment-not merely determine
whether or not candidates meet an acceptable standard, but
decide who among many acceptable candidates are the best
qualified.
4. Have the ability and the opportunity to encourage the
ablest lawyers to become candidates.
5. Be independent of the appointing authority.
6. Be free of the reward system of politics.
7. Be free of domination by the organized bar, but able to
make the best use of the organized bar in the selection process.
8. Have no continuing relationship with a judge after he is on
the bench.
9. Recognize the importance of having a judiciary that is representative of the various elements in the society that it serves.
The prerequisites for the qualified judge have been established.
To best evaluate which process of judicial selection would be most
likely to produce that judge, the selection systems under discussion here will be held accountable to the Niles criteria.
It is advisable when considering these two sets of criteria to
remember that for any one method of judicial selection to have a
substantial impact on the judiciary system as a whole, it must not
only meet these quality standards, but it must also be practical
enough to adapt to the social and legal climate. As the history of
judicial selection shows, the evolution of time and thought is
capable of putting enormous stress on bureaucratic processes
which are too rigid. The nlost efficient and effective judicial selec19. Niles, supra note 11, at 243-44.
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tion system will be that one which is as receptive to its environment as it is faithful to its basic principles.
III.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: AN OVERVIEW

In Medieval England judges were an integral part of the
monarchy." Judicial tenure was determined by loyalty to a particular King or Queen, not by personal competence or equity.
Judges served at the whim of the Crown and when the monarch's
rule terminated, so did the judges' commissions.21
Slowly, however, this dependent relationship began to
change and judges became progressively more independent of
the Crown. In the Magna Carta, the King stipulated, "We will
appoint as justices . . . only men that know the law of the realm
and are minded to keep it well." ' 2 After 1688, as a result of
the revolution against the Stuarts, the monarch no longer held
the power to dismiss judges at will. By William and Mary's time,
judicial appointments were more apt to be based on merit,2 3 and
this trend was finally and firmly established in 1700 by the Act
24
of Settlement which provided that:
Judges commissions be made quamdiu se benegesserint [as
long as they will conduct themselves properly], and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both
houses of parliament it may be lawful to remove them.
Commissions still ended automatically, however, with the death
of a monarch, and it was not until 1760 that a statute was passed
25
which provided that:
[C]ommissions of the Judges . . . shall . . .remain in full
force during good behavior notwithstanding the demise of His
Majesty . . .or of any of his heirs and successors ....
The Act of Settlement did not apply to Britain's overseas
territories, which meant that all colonial judges in America were
20. For historical material, see HAYNES, supra note 10, at 51-101; Winters, Selection

of Judges-An HistoricalIntroduction,44 TEXAS L. REV. 1081 (1966); Winters, The Merit
Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its HistoricalDevelopment, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV.
61 (1968).
21. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 54-55.
22. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 45 (1215). See W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 431-33 (1914).
23. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 78.
24. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3, para. 8 (1700).
25. 1 Geo. 3, c. 23, § 1 (1760).
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appointed directly by the King and served exclusively at his pleasure.2" The inequity of this situation did not go unnoticed in revolutionary America and was specifically cited in the Declaration
of Independence: "He [the King of England] has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries."2 7 After independence,
the 13 new states adopted various judicial selection systems designed to do away with individual control of the judiciary. Seven
states provided for appointment by the legislature;2s five states,
by the governor and a council;2" and one state; Delaware, by the
governor and the legislature.30 Furthermore, all the states which
entered the Union, beginning with Vermont in 1791 and including
Texas in 1845, utilized either a legislative or a modified gubernatorial system of selection.'
As the new nation grew and suffrage was extended, there
soon were calls for the popular election of judges. These proposals
seem to have been designed not so much to improve the judiciary,
but rather as a manifestation of the populist ideology inspired by
Andrew Jackson and his contemporaries.3 2 As Evan Haynes has
33
observed:
[T]he fundamental causes of that change had very little to do
with the relative merits of. . .that system of judicial selection
and tenure but were rather the ideas and impulses of a violent
swing toward the democratization of government generally. The
more mature and seasoned countries of Europe, who experienced the same revolution in government, preserved the idea
that judges should be competently selected, and free of political
pressure; but in America, the ebullient enthusiasm and intemperance of youth and inexperience carried all before it.
Mississippi became the first state to adopt a completely elected
judiciary in 1832,' 4 but it was not until after the New York Consti26. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supranote 13, at 8.
27. U.S. Declaration of Independence, Ninth Specification (1776).

28. Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 105, 108, 121, 124, 127-28, 133.
29. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania. Id. at
115, 121, 123, 127.
30. Id. at 106.
31. Id. at 101-35.
32. Id. at 88. By the election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency in 1828 all but two

states had universal manhood suffrage. See generallyA.

SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON

322-33 (1945).
33. HAYNES, supra note 10, at 100-01.
34. MIss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 2, 11, 16 (1832). Mississippi abandoned the elective system
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tutional Convention of 1846 that a major shift to elected judges
began.
In post-colonial New York, societal control was highly stratified and the economic and governmental power in the state was
concentrated in the hands of a very few landed families. ' Since
judges were appointed by the governor,36 they naturally tended to
be part of the social establishment and could be counted upon to
3
uphold the often oppressive leases 37 of the landlords:
Nowhere was the power of the landlord in politics reflected more
impressively than in the social background of the officials who
functioned as governors, judges and attorneys, councilors and
assemblymen.
In reaction to this domination by the landed classes, New
York's substantial tenant population turned to political action.3 9
in 1868, Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 2, 3, 11 (1868), returned to it in 1910, and retains the
elective system at present, Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145B, 153, 171; HAYNES, supra note 10,
at 117.
35. See, e.g., Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, 21
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523, 524 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HistoricalPerspective]. See
generally H. CHRISTAIAN, TIN HORNS AND CALICO (1945); R. FOWLER, HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY IN NEW YORK (1895); D. Fox, DECLINE OF THE ARISTOCRACY IN THE
POLITICS OF NEW YORK (1919); I. MARK, AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 17111775 (1940). The New York State situation is fairly representative of what happened in
most other states during the same period, see, e.g., HAYNES, supra note 10, at 86.
36. See, e.g., Lindsay, The Selection of Judges-Does it Serve the Ends of Justice?,
50 JUDICATURE 223, 224 (1967). The New York Constitutional Convention of 1777 modified
the Governor's authority to appoint judges by creating a Council of Appointments to pass
on nominations, but this Council eventually became a patronage vehicle so the Constitutional Convention of 1821 returned the judicial appointing power to the Governor.
37. Historical Perspective, supra note 35, at 523; New York State Assembly Document No. 156, Mar. 28, 1846, Report of the Select Committee on so much of the Governor's
message as relates to the difficulties existing between the proprietors of certain leasehold
estates and their tenants, &c; FIAT JUSTITIA (pseud.), ANTI-RENT CONTROVERSY, Oct. 1865
(this pamphlet was a reprinting of 17 anonymous articles that had appeared in the Albany
Daily Express the preceding August discussing the landlord-tenant problems in New
York); Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals upon the Manor Question, 1859,
(privately printed) (this pamphlet was probably authored by H.J. Colvin and Anson
Bingham, two leading authorities on New York property law who were sympathetic to
the case of the tenants); Speech by Rev. Harry F. Harrington, The Responsibility of
American Citizenship: A Sermon Preached on the Occasion of the "Anti-Rent" Disturbance, Dec. 22, 1844 (pamphlet in New York State Library, Albany, New York).
38. D. Fox, New York Becomes a Democracy,in 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
88 (A. Flick ed. 1934).
39. Historical Perspective, supra note 35, at 523-28. Besides the political activity
there was also a great deal of physical strife and violence. In 1845 the situation was so
serious that a state of insurrection was declared and it was not safe for either landlords or
their agents to travel far afield. See generally P. MILLER, A GROUP OF GREAT LAWYERS OF
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At the 1821 Constitutional Convention they joined with the agrarian reformers and urban workers to abolish the property qualifications for voting." At the 1846 Convention-armed with the
vote, supported by the Jacksonian Democrats, and aroused by the
conviction of one of their leaders, Dr. Smith Boughton, in 1845
on the suspicious charge of "highway robbery""-the reformers
amended the constitution to allow for popular election of judges42
in the state.4 3
New York set off a chain reaction. By 1856, 15 of the 29 states
had swung over to the elective method of judicial selection and
every state that entered the union after that time, until Alaska
in 1959, adopted the electoral approach.4 4 Because of the limited
social base on which the appointive system operated, the elective

system broadened the composition of the judiciary somewhat,45
but nonetheless public dissatisfaction and disillusionment soon

set in.46 Among the first judicial reform groups inside the legal
community to challenge the elective method was the Association

of the Bar of the City of New York which was formed in 187011
largely in an effort to restore the confidence of the public in the
bench. 8 By 1880 a number of other bar associations, including the
(1904); Niven, A Chapterof Anti-Rent History, 24 ALBANY
L.J. 125 (1881).
40. HistoricalPerspective, supra note 35, at 524.
41. Id.
42. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 12, 14 (1846).
43. With some minor changes, judicial selection in New York has remained elective
since 1846. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 6c, 9, 10a, 12b, 13a, 15, 16g, 16h, 17d, 21. See, e.g.,
Kaminsky, supra note 8, at 502-03; Lindsay, 50 JUDICATURE, supra note 36, at 224-25
(1967). The New York Constitutional Convention of 1894 allowed the Governor to appoint
judges to the newly created Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Claims, and permitted local executives to appoint certain local judges. It is this latter
power that allows the Mayor of New York City to appoint judges to the New York City
Criminal and Family Courts. At the Conventions in 1915 and 1921 there were major unCOLUMBIA COUNTY, NEW YORK

successful efforts to abolish the elective system. Id.

There have recently been efforts in New York State to have judges of the court of
appeals appointed rather than elected. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON COURT REORGANIZATION, REVISED PRELIMINARY REPORT 1-7 (Feb. 26, 1974).
44. HistoricalPerspective, supra note 35, at 527.
45. Id.
46. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 10. See section IV infra.
47. See generally 1 N.Y.C.B.A. REP. (1870-1876).
48. In 1873 the Association endorsed a plan for the appointment of judges, Historical

Perspectives,supra note 35, at 535-36 n.49. For a recent statement by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York on judicial selection, see The Selection of Judges, 28
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 372 (1973). See also THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON THE MUNICIPAL COURTS, REPORT ON CONSIDERATION OF NEW
METHODS TO SELECT JUDGES OF THE MUNICIPAL COURTS (1952); THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
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American Bar Association, had been established to help improve
the quality of the judiciary in this country. 9
Many states with the elective system were concerned about
the adverse effect which politics was having on judicial selection
and looked for ways to curb political abuse and, at the same time,
retain the popular vote. Around the turn of the century, a number
of different measures were adopted which were intended to insulate judicial elections from politics." The most popular of
these was the nonpartisan election,51 but many states also implemented such procedures as special nominating committees,
direct judicial primaries, and shortened ballots.2
Judicial reform was significantly augmented on August 29,
1906, when a young Roscoe Pound delivered his historic address,
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice" to the annual meeting of the American Bar Association. 3 In that speech he observed:54
[We must not be deceived by this innocuous and inevitable
discontent with all law into overlooking or underrating the real
and serious dissatisfaction with the courts and lack of respect
for law which exists in the United States today ....
.. . Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to
become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed
the traditional respect for the Bench.
Seven years later, Pound, Herbert Harley, John Wigmore,
and others founded the American Judicature Society for the purpose of encouraging efficiency and quality in the administration
of justice.5 The next year, 1914, Albert M. Kales, a member of
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION, SELECTION OF JUDGES (1967); THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw
YORK, A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL SELECTION MATERIALS (1971).
49. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 10.
50. Id.; WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 8; e.g., Matson, Let Elected Commission Choose Judges, 14 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 13 (1930).

51. See generally Moos, Judicial Elections and PartisanEndorsement of Judicial
Candidates in Minnesota, 35 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 69 (1941); Non-PartisanBallot in Oregon,
16 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 44 (1932) (report of a study by the Oregon State Bar Association on
judicial selection and tenure).

52. See, e.g., Kots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'v 134 (1955).
53. See generally D. WIGDoR, ROSCOE POUND 123-29 (1974); Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's
St. Paul Address of 1906, 20 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 176 (1937).
54. Pound, supra note 6, at 396, 415.
55. See Introduction, 1 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 3 (1917). Since its founding in 1913, the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3

14

Dunn: Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals

Judicial Selection

Wigmore's faculty at Northwestern Law School and the director
of research for the Society, devised a judicial selection method
intended to combine the benefits but avoid the weaknesses of
both the elective and appointive procedures. He suggested that
judges be appointed by the chief justice of the state who
should be popularly elected on a frequent basis. Kales proposed,
in addition, that the appointed judges have their performance
reviewed periodically through elections in which the voters would
decide only the question of whether a particular judge should be
retained. 6 The eminent British economist and political scientist,
Harold Laski, suggested in a 1926 article that the executive rather
than the chief judge should make the appointments. 5 Two years
later the American Judicature Society adopted the Kales plan
with the Laski amendment," and the American Bar Association
followed suit in 1937.11 In 1940, after similar measures had been
American Judicature Society, through the writings and activities of its officials, staff, and
members, has probably been the most active force for judicial selection reform in this
country. Especially influential has been its publication, the Journal of the American
JudicatureSociety, which changed its name to Judicaturein 1966 (beginning with Volume
50). The impetus for the formation of the Society was a letter sent to over 100 lawyers
throughout the country by Herbert Harley suggesting the formation of an organization to
study and propose reforms for more equitable and efficient judicial administration; Harley, A Circular Letter Concerning the Administration of Justice, Oct. 7, 1912. In that letter
Harley anticipated that the issue of judicial selection would long concern the legal community: "The question of an elective or appointive judiciary is not one to be settled in
any casual treatise. We may never settle it absolutely." Id. at 11. The early writings of
the Society on the subject of judicial selection include: Hall, The Selection, Tenure and
Retirement of Judges, 2 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 37 (1919); Matson, Let Elected Commission
Choose Judges, 14 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 13 (1930); Editorial,3 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 67 (1919);
Selecting and RetiringJudges, 3 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 165 (1920); Selecting Judges in Large
Cities, 14 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 155 (1931); Should Bar Choose Judges?, 13 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v
134 (1930); Who Should Choose Our Judges?, 8 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v 48 (1924).
56. BULL. No. VI, AM. JUD. Soc'y 29 (1914); Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring
Judges in a Metropolitan District, 52 ANNALS 1 (1914) (these articles were adopted from
Kales' address to the Minnesota State Bar Association in St. Paul on August 20, 1914).
See also A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1915); Kales, Methods
of Selecting and RetiringJudges, 11 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 133 (1928); Selecting and Retiring
Judges, 3 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 165 (1920). Dean Dorothy W. Nelson of the University of
Southern California Law Center has suggested that it may be wise to return to Kales'
original suggestion of appointment by the Chief Judge. Nelson, 36 S. CAL. L. REV., supra
note 12, at 53-54. Professor Delmar Karlen of New York University Law School, a former
Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration, has made a similar suggestion. D.
KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

30-31 (1970).

57. Laski, The Technique of JudicialAppointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529, 533 (1926).
58. Editorial,11 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 131 (1928).
59. 23 A.B.A.J. 102 (1937).
WHEREAS, The importance of establishing methods of Judicial Selection
that will be most conducive to the maintenance of a thoroughly qualified and
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defeated in two other states, the voters of Missouri adopted a
modified version of the Kales-Laski plan for its supreme court,
its appellate court, and for one of its local jurisdictions. 0
independent judiciary and that will take the state judges out of politics as nearly
as may be, is generally recognized; and
WHEREAS, In many states movements are under way to find acceptable
substitutes for direct election of judges;

Now,

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED

By the House of Delegates of the Ameri-

can Bar Association that in its judgment the following plan offers the most
acceptable substitute available for direct election of judges:
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or other
elective official or officials, but from a list named by another agency, composed
in part of high judicial officers and in part of other citizens, selected for the
purpose, who hold no other public office.
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such check may be
supplied by the requirement of confirmation by the State Senate or other legislative body of appointments made through the dual agency suggested.
Id. at 105;
(c) The appointee shall after a period of service be eligible for reappointment thereafter or go before the people upon his record with no opposing candidate, the people voting upon the question, Shall Judge Blank be retained in
office?
Id. at 108.
For more recent statements of the ABA on this subject, see generally ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, TENURE AND COMPENSATION, THE ABA NON-PARTISAN
PLAN FOR SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (1958); MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ACT §§ 5, 6, 8,
10 (adopted by the ABA in Feb., 1962) in SELECTED READINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENT 23 (G. Winters & R. Lowe ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

Winters & Lowe] also in 87 ANN. REP. OF THE ABA 591-99 (1962); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, TENURE AND COMPENSATION, MODEL BY-LAWS FOR STATE AND

LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS RESPECTING APPOINTMENT AND ELECTION OF JUDGES (1968); ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, TENURE AND COMPENSATION, HANDBOOK FOR
MEMBERS OF JUDICIARY COMMITTEES (1968); ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ADMINISTRATION, § 1.21 SELECTION OF
JUDGES (1974).
60. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 9-12; Peltason, The Missouri Plan for the
Selection of Judges, 20 U. OF Mo. STUDIES 1 (1945).

The plan was approved by Missouri voters three times in the course of five years. Less
than 60 days after the court plan first became effective, opponents in the legislature
passed by one vote a resolution to resubmit the issue to the voters in the 1942 general
election. At that time the plan was approved by a 170,000 vote margin, twice its original
majority. Then the plan was voted on and passed again in 1945 when the voters approved
a new state constitution. Hyde, Judges: Their Selection and Tenure, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
389, 396-97 (1947); Schroeder & Hall, 44 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 14, at 1090-91.
Efforts similar to the Missouri reform had failed earlier in Michigan and Ohio. Six
years before the 1940 election in Missouri, California voters adopted a constitutional
amendment creating a Commission on Qualifications made up of the chief judge of the
state supreme court, the state attorney general, and the presiding justice of the district
court of appeals in the district affected, which confirms gubernatorial appointments to
the appellate benches before they can become effective. The Commission does not make
recommendations. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 26 (1934); CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 7, 16; Nelson,
36 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 12, at 6-7.
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The Missouri plan requires that the governor appoint to the
court one of three names that are submitted by a judicial nominating committee. This committee is chaired by the chief justice
of the state supreme court and consists of three lay members
appointed by the governor and three lawyers elected by the bar.
After sitting for the first year, a judge is then required to run in
an approval/disapproval election, and at the completion of each
term must run in a similar election in order to continue in office.
If the majority votes for disapproval, then the judge must step
down at the end of the term and a vacancy is declared." As Table
I and Appendices H,112 III,3 IV," V,65 and V165 indicate, the adoption of the plan in Missouri acted as a catalyst for the adoption
of similar plans in other states, 7 either by constitutional amend61. Mo. CONST. art. 5, §§ 29(a), 29(b), 29(c)(1), 29(c)(2), 29(d), 29(e), 29(f), 29(g)
(1940). The procedure outlined in the text pertains to selection by the Missouri Appellate
Judicial Commission covering the appellate and supreme court. There are slightly different rules for the size and membership of committees for different courts.
Although the procedure remains substantially the same today, at a special election
on August 4, 1970, some changes were made to expand the area included in the plan. The
new provisions allow the commission to appoint a judge if the governor does not do so
within 60 days; allow the commission to choose its own chairperson; and allow the state
supreme court to choose which one of their members shall sit on the commission, rather
than the chief judge doing so automatically. Mo. CONST. art 5, §§ 29(a), 29(c)(1), 29(d)
(1970); Note, Judicial Selection in New York: A Need for a Change, 3 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 605, 625-31 (1975). These constitutional provisions are set forth in Appendix I.
62. Appendix II is adapted from material contained in Appendices V and VI, see
notes 65 and 66 infra. Cf. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 19. The maps in Appendices
II, III, and IV are by J. Renacia.
63. Appendix III is adapted from material contained in Appendices V and VI, see
notes 65 and 66 infra. Cf. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 20.
64. Appendix IV is adapted from material contained in Appendices V and VI, see
notes 65 and 66 infra. Cf. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 21.
65. The material in Appendix V was compiled and updated by Brenda J. Bogan,
Administrative Assistant, under the direction of Edward J. Schoenbaum, Director of
Programs and Services for the American Judicature Society.
66. Appendix VI is primarily adopted from S. Escovrrz, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 17-42 (1975) (report issued by the American Judicature Society). The material has
been updated and expanded where appropriate. See also 20 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES

115-34 (1974); LowE, supra note 12, at 16-21;

SELECTED

219-21 (Rev. ed., G. Winters ed, 1973).
To get the clearest possible view of the court systems in states operating under various
Missouri plans, it is necessary to read Appendix V in conjunction with Appendix VI and
the applicable constitutional and statutory material mentioned therein.
READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE

67. R.

ALLARD, JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM AMENDMENTS

(1962) (report for the Am-

erican Judicature Society); McDonald, Missouri's Ideal Judicial Selection Law, 24 J.
Am. JUD. Soc'Y 194 (1941); Wood, Missouri Voters Speed National Judicial Reform, 26
J. Am. JUn. Soc'Y 142 (1943); Report of the Kansas Judicial Study Advisory Committee
-Recommendations for Improving the Kansas Judicial System, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 271,
380-84 (1974). The Missouri experience was also the model for many reform efforts
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ment, statute, or voluntary arrangement on the part of the appointing authority."'
TABLE 18
This table indicates the time when
judicial selection plans similar to
that adopted in Missouri were
first put into effect in various
jurisdictions and the manner in
which they became effective. For
the current status of these plans
see Appendices IV, V, and VI.
Key:

1940

Missouri (C)

C - Constitutional
S - Statutory
V - Voluntary

1950

1960

1970

Alabama (C)

Colorado (C)

Arizona (C)

Alaska (C)
Kansas (C)

Idaho (S)
Iowa (C)
Nebraska (C)
Oklahoma (V)
Utah (S)
Vermont (S)

District of Columbia (S)
Florida (C)
Georgia (V)
Indiana (C)
Maryland (V)
Massachusetts (V)
Montana (C)
New York (V)
Pennsylvania (V)
South Carolina (V)
Tennessee (S)
Wyoming (C)

which were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Tendler, The MissouriPlan ... How It Works, 30 Mo.
ST. B.J. 28-31 (1951).
68. Some appointing authorities have adopted various forms of voluntary Missouri
procedures. It is important to remember that although these programs are usually binding
on the current executive, they can be easily changed or dispensed with by his or her
successor. The Appendices include the major voluntary plans. See State of Georgia, Executive Order, Judicial Nominating Commission for the State of Georgia, Apr. 28, 1975;
State of Maryland, Executive Order, Court of Appeals of Maryland, Appellate and Trial
Court Judicial Selection Regulations, Dec. 18, 1974; Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Executive Order No. 114, Judicial Nominating Commission, Jan. 3, 1975; State of New
York, Executive Order No. 5, Feb. 21, 1975; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Executive
Order 1973-5, Creation of the Appellate Court Nominating Commission and Trial Court
Nominating Commission, As Amended Mar. 6, 1975; AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REPORT No. 36, VOLUNTARY MERIT SELECTION PLANS (R. Lowe & J. Alfini ed. 1972); Lowe,
Voluntary Merit Selection Plans, 55 JUDICATURE 161 (1971); Rosenman, A Better Way to
Select Judges, 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 86 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rosenman]; Boston
Globe, Sept. 14, 1975, at A5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
69. Table I is primarily adapted from Lowe, Voluntary Merit Selection Plans, 55
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Appendix VI outlines the current status of judicial selection in the states. Eight states use straight gubernatorial appointment, and five provide for election by the legislature."
However, the great bulk of states either use election (both parti71
san and nonpartisan) or some variation of the Missouri plan.
IV.

ELECTIVE JUDICIAL SELECTION

The case for elective judicial selection centers on two principal arguments: the open nature of elections and the appeal of
political competition.7 2 Citing America's tradition of republican
government, proponents of judicial elections claim that the process of electing judges is the most open and straightforward
method of selection, and further, that popular participation at
the polls produces the beneficial result of a judiciary which is
both representative of and accountable to the electorate. It is
argued as well that since judges are part of our political life, the
competitive political election serves as the best mechanism by
which to educate the public about judicial candidates and insure
that judges are responsible to the people.
The arguments for elective judicial selection are theoretically
appealing but, in fact, misleading. In spite of our republican tradition, an elected judiciary was not part of America's democratic
experiment.7 3 On the contrary, as the history of judicial selection
JUDICATURE 161, 162 (1971); LOWE supra note 12, at 127. The material has been updated

and expanded where appropriate.
70. Appendix VI; Comment, Methods of JudicialSelection and a Viable Alternative,
4 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REv. 109, 110 (1975).
71. The Missouri plan and its variations are often referred to in legal and judicial
literature as "non-partisan merit selection plans" or, more simply, "merit plans." The use
of the term "merit" in this context tends to be ambiguous and conclusive, implying that
the Missouri system of judicial selection is based only on merit while alternative methods
of selecting judges are not. The use of such prejudicial terminology is not conducive to an
objective analysis of judicial selection systems. Therefore, the term "Missouri plan" is
used in this article to denote the various state systems of judicial selection which conform
generally to the schema adopted by Missouri in 1940.
72. See, e.g., E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 173-210 (1966); Burnett, Observations on the Direct-Election Method of Judicial Selection, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1098
(1966); Costikyan, The Lawyer As Politician, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 447 (1967); Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary:For Election, 24 B. BULL. N.Y. COUNTY LAwYERS ASS'N
215 (1967); Harding, The Case for PartisanElection of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969);
Mullinax, JudicialRevision-An Argument Against the Merit Plan for JudicialSelection
and Tenure, 5 TEXAs TECH. L. REv. 21 (1973); Roth, Why I Am Against The California
Merit Plan, The Missouri Plan-OrAny Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAUF. S.B.J.
346 (1967); Spence, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan? No, 40 FLA. B.J. 1147
(1966).
73. See section I supra.
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in this country demonstrates, the Founding Fathers did not object to the appointment of judges per se, but rather to the way in
which the concept was abused by King George. Upon the grant
of independence, each new state opted for a method of judicial
selection which had its basis in the appointive approach.74 Furthermore, when the election of judges came into vogue in the
1840's and 1850's, it did so in response to a particular social
impulse, not in an attempt to return to a specific judicial tradition.7"
Similarly, the assumption that the election of judges is an
open method of selection has little basis in fact. In many instances, the theoretical process of free judicial elections does not, in
practice, exist. What does exist more often is a system of judicial
appointment dominated by party and government leaders and
supported, often unwittingly, by the organized bar and the judges
themselves.
In many jurisdictions, for example, the vacation of a judgeship before the end of a term transfers to the executive the right
to appoint an interim successor. This has two major ramifications: it oftentimes allows the executive to make unrestricted
appointments, and it confers upon the appointee the status of
incumbent, which in elective judicial contests is practically
tantamount to victory in the next election." Likewise, in nonincumbent elections, it is common practice for political parties to
combine their forces informally, divide prospective seats among
themselves and cross-endorse their precontracted contestants.
True competition is thus substantially diminished and victory for
the pre-arranged judicial candidates is virtually assured. 77 It was
this particular procedure which prompted the Association of the
7
Bar of the City of New York to comment in 1932 that:
74. See notes 28-30 supra.
75. Historical Perspective, supra note 35, at 526. See generally note 35 supra.
76. Winters, One-Man Judicial Selection, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 198 (1962). In Washington, a state with a judiciary that is theoretically elected, 75 percent of the superior
court judges, 92 percent of the court of appeals judges and 66 percent of the supreme court
judges reached the bench via gubernatorial appointments to fill vacancies. Utter,
Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REV. 839, 842 (1973). See

generally M.

BROMBERG & L. KORN, JUDGES: THEIR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT, ASSIGNMENT
AND TRANSFER (1962) (published by the Institute of Judicial Administration, New York

City); Herndon, Appointment As A Means of InitialAccess to State Courtsof Last Resort,
38 N. DAK. L. REV. 60 (1962); Note, Analysis of Methods of JudicialSelection and Tenure,
6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 955, 956-58 (1972); N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1975, at 21, col. 1.
77. See, e.g., Newsday, Sept. 6, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
78. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Report of the
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The elective system has not actually transferred the power of
selection of judges from some person or group of persons to the
people . . . but has merely permitted them [the electorate] to
vote for candidates selected by the managers of the dominant
political parties, with little or no control over the choice of the
candidates, with the result that the elective system simply substitutes for a responsible agent of appointment an obscure and
irresponsible one ....

As surprising as it may seem, it has been estimated that in some
districts over 90 percent of the judges on the elected bench arrived
there either by appointment or through bi-partisan endorsement.79

In many instances, the elective method of judicial selection
creates its own weaknesses. The decisions of the voters in these
elections are rarely based on a consideration of the qualifications
of competing candidates. Judicial contests in districts with lopsided political majorities, for example, are little more than fait
accomplis, particularly since most judicial candidates ride to victory or defeat not on their own abilities, but rather on the coattails of their party colleagues running at the head of the ticket.
Similarly, competent judges can be swept out of office, regardless
of their individual merits, as the result of a strong national political tide which bears no relation to the judicial contest involved.
As Harold Laski has concluded:"0
The people do not, in fact, choose their judges. They decide
between candidates of opposing parties, and with rare exceptions, they merely vote for the color they happen to prefer.

Even in districts where pre-election meddling is minimal and
political odds are equitable, voters may still be swayed by the
Committee on the Judiciary on Methods of Selecting Judges, in YEAR BOOK 1932-1933, at
180, 181 (1933) (Report filed Feb. 9, 1932, citing a resolution of the Bar Association of
Nassau County, N.Y.); Lindsay, The Selection of Judges, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 514,
516 (1966). See also the statement of former New York State Court of Appeals Judge
George Z. Medalie in THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 3 (1963):
It [the elective system] pretends that the people select the judges. That is
the greatest farce that has ever been enacted in the history of democracy. ...
The selection of judges is made, not by the people, but by the leaders of the
predominant parties . ...
79. Citizens Union Constitution Revision Committee, Position Paper No. 13, New
York State Constitutional Convention, Judges by Popular Inattention 1-3 (1967); P. DeWitt, JudicialSelection Plan, in A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL SELECTION MATERIALS 1 (Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1971).
80. Laski, 24 MICH. L. REV., supra note 57, at 531.
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opinions of influential outside forces. One illustration is the case
of the organized bar. In close judicial elections the public and the
press often look to the bar associations as neutral sources of information and guidance. A bar association will, however, occasionally take an unusually strong position in a judicial contest. Although a stated preference is certainly ethical, it raises some
vexing questions about the power of the bar. Most disturbing is
the fact that such endorsements tend to come very late in a race,
thereby severely limiting the opportunity for rebuttal. In any
event, these enilorsements stand virtually uncontradicted since
there is no organization with the authority or reputation of the
bar to counterbalance, much less rebut, the latter's more energetic advocacies. It is important that those who specialize in the
law pass on their knowledge of the judiciary to the electorate, but
unfortunately there is sometimes a thin line to be drawn between
the offering of neutral opinions and voter manipulation.
Defenders of an elected judiciary have augmented their assumption that the election of judges is a free and open process by
citing the healthy competition inspired by political contests. Although the partisan political system has proved to be a valuable
governing mechanism in many areas of public concern, its positive attributes are often overshadowed by its defects when applied to judicial selection." The disturbing effects which the pol81. See, e.g.,

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON

LAW REFORM, REPORT ON CONSIDERATION OF NEW METHODS To SELECT JUDGES 3-11,
Adopted Dec. 9, 1952; A. BRUCE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE 124-45 (1924); H. GLICK, SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 121-56 (1971); A. PRESS
& C. PHILIP, CASE STUDY OF AJUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN (1976) (an Institute of Judicial

Administration study of the 1973 election for Chief Judge of the New York State Court of
Appeals); S. ROSENBLATT, JUSTICE DENIED 257-59, 287-90, 292-93 (1971); Smith & Ehrmann, The Bench and Its Background, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE INCLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE
CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO

251,

259-66, 268-72 (R. Pound and F. Frankfurter eds. 1922); M. STECICH, ELECTING NEW YORK
JUDGES (1976) (a study for the Institute of Judicial Administration of judicial selection in
the boroughs of the Bronx and Manhattan, New York City); Committee for Modem
Courts and a Coalition of Other Organizations for Court Reform, Judging the Judges 3-5
(Final Report of the Panel on Selection, Tenure and Removal of Judges, Apr. 1973); Berle,
Elected Judges-Or Appointed?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1955, § 6 (Magazine), at 26; Editorial, Who Picks Our Judges?, THE SEARCHLIGHT, Vol. 43, No. 3, Dec. 1953, at 2 (prepared
by the Citizens Union of New York City); Garwood, Democracy and the PopularElection
of Judges, 16 SW. L.J. 216 (1962); Editorial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1975 at 30, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1975 at 55, col. 1.
In a national poll taken on this matter, Americans responded by a large margin that
their local judges were chiefly selected on the basis of politics and not their judicial qualifications. The Gallup Poll; AIPO No. 589, Quest. 21, Sept. 1957 (data located at Roper
Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts). Additionally, Ameri-
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this observation
itical environment has on the judiciary prompted
82
from an American Bar Association report:
There is no harm in turning a politician into a judge. He may
become a good judge. The curse of the elective system is that it
turns every elected judge into a politician.
Supporters of elective judicial selection have further stated
that it is a mistake to deviate from that system since it has
produced some outstanding judges.83 Not only, however, is there
no evidence to suggest that an elected judiciary is in any way
more competent than one which is responsibly appointed, but the
prospect of a political election has undoubtedly discouraged
many qualified individuals from seeking an elected judgeship. As
Arthur Vanderbilt has written:84
Many desirable potential judges. . . are disinclined to encounter the recurring hazards of a political campaign for election,
and so the field of choice is unfortunately narrowed.
A major fault of the elective system is that the political recruitment of judicial candidates tends to be based not on character qualifications but, instead, on individual service to the
party.8 5 As Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman concluded with
cans have indicated that the fact that "judges are appointed for political reasons only" is
one of the major problems of the justice system. The Gallup Organization, Newsweek
Survey, Law and Justice, AIPO No. G07038, Nov. 3, 1970 (data located at Roper Public
Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts).
82. ABA

SECTION

OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

THE IMPROVEMENT

OF THE

(5th ed. 1971).
83. E.g., 171 N.Y.L.J. 25 (1974) (article by former Chief Judge of the New York State
Court of Appeals Charles S. Desmond).
84. Vanderbilt, Impasses in Justice, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 267, 275.
85. E.g., Singer, Kenyon & Korn, Towards Better Judges 5-7(1961) (Citizens Union
Research Foundation, New York City):
[Tihe selection of the judiciary . . . whether by election or appointment, is
embedded in politics. It forms, in fact, one of the principal mainstays of our
political and district leadership system. A judgeship is one of the biggest plums
in the patronage larder....
The politicians have a vested interest in the judiciary for three reasons.
Second, each judgeship
First, the posts are highly desirable in themselves ....
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 45

carries in its train a number of lucrative minor posts which a judge beholden to
the leader for his office is likely to fill with persons named by the leader. Third,
higher courts have considerable patronage dispensing powers ....
...It has been estimated that about 93% of New York City's judges are
members of the Democratic Party. This does not mean that more Democrats
than Republicans have judicial qualifications; it merely means that the party
takes care of its own.
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respect to recruiting methods in New York City:8"
The court system provides much of the fuel for party engines
S.,. .. [Piredominant among the ranks of those who give unstintingly of their time and energy and money to their party are
lawyers striving for positions on the bench, and both lawyers
and nonlawyers endeavoring to establish claims on other court
posts. On the one hand, this enables the parties to recruit, hold
and motivate a large body of willing, industrious and often able
workers in their cause. On the other hand, it helps the parties
maintain a measure of discipline in their ranks . . . . For jobs
of this kind, people are willing to work and wait . . . [and]
accept the onerous chores of party activity ....
Political activity can basically be divided into two types:
that which involves the development of governmental policies
responsive to the needs of a heterogeneous society and that which
seeks to widen a power base primarily for the sake of increasing
political control. Although we are inclined to condone the former
and condemn the latter, these tasks are by no means mutually
exclusive. The judicial candidate who is a loyal and hardworking
party member may make a competent public official. However,
if party servitude is all that is required of judicial contestants,
there is no guarantee-and, in fact, little hope-that they will
meet any of the six qualitative criteria established in section II
to identify the proficient judge.87
Once they become candidates, prospective judges are then
faced with the ordeal of a campaign. Not only must judicial candidates solicit financial contributions for their own campaigns,
but they are often requested to make a monetary donation to the
party in anticipation of the well-paying job to come. Both of these
practices encourage serious problems of undue influence and conflict of interest.8 Furthermore, the advantages which the public
86. W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY 538 (1960). See also E.
COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DooRs (1966); M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR...;
POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE (1971). The issue of
political recruiting practices is a nationwide problem of which New York City is representative. See, e.g., Brownell, Too Many Judges are PoliticalHacks, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Apr. 18, 1964, at 10.
87. E.g., Rosenman supra note 68, at 92:
[Tihe [New York City] Mayor's [judicial selection] committee has never
considered political activity as a disadvantage to a candidate but rather an
asset. It has publicly so stated; but, at the same time, it has rejected political
service as the sole, or even the major, qualification for recommendation.
88. E.g., W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEw YORK CITY 543 (1960):
Like all organizations of the modem world, parties need money to operate.
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has been led to expect from judicial electioneering are greatly
restricted by the ethical regulations of both the bar and the

courts."9 Indeed, unless a candidate has been guilty of some gross
professional or judicial abuse, there are very few issues which may
be openly aired for the benefit of the voting public. Judicial campaigns are therefore principally ceremonial with minimal give
and take between prospective judges and their electorate." SimiClearly, one of the primary reasons the court system is of such profound concern
to the parties is that this is where a part of their money comes from.
See note 92 infra. See also D. EATON, SHOULD JUDGES BE ELECTED (1873); Tolchin &
Tolchin, How Judgeships Get Bought, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Mar. 15, 1971, at 29; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 5; Newsday, Sept. 6, 1975, at 3, col. 1.

89. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 198-229 (1967 ed.); ABA SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (adopted by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association on Aug. 16, 1972); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGES 3-20 (D. Carrol ed. 1961); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINION 882, ETHICAL GUIDELINES
FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (1973); THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER CLEVELAND, CAMPAIGNING
FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE: A REVIEW OF ETHICAL CONSIDERATONS (1974); THE BAR ASSOCIATION
OF GREATER CLEVELAND, RULES OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION COMMI'rEE (1974); MISSiSSIPPI
STATE BAR, RULES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS §§ 28, 30 (1963); NATIONAL COLLEGE OF THE STATE
JUDICIARY, ETHICS FOR JUDGES (D. Fretz preparer 1973); E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973); Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1970).
90. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTATION, REPORTS TO THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON
13 (1972);
How To Be Elected Judge in Detroit, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 186 (1929); N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1975, at 29, col. 1.
These ceremonial campaigns do not allow candidates to become acquainted with the
needs and wishes of their electorate, nor do they particularly inform the voter. The following is Probate Judge Louis Kohn's description of judicial campaigning in St. Louis County
before the Missouri plan was extended to that district in 1970:
The ordeal . . . is similar to that of a candidate for public office. But it is
in no way geared to select the person who will make the best judge ....
If our future judge has primary opposition he must attend every township
meeting, every township picnic, every card party and every kind of party function to solicit support. If he has no opposition he still must make the endless
rounds of meetings.
Nomination or endorsement really turns out to be a question of deciding
who is the best candidate on the basis of the three-minute talk the candidate
gave at the meeting, or the candidate's physical appearance, or how big a contribution he made to the township campaign fund.
St. Louis County has 18 townships and every one has at least one political
club and some have as many as six . . ... The candidate must make as many
as three or four speeches in one night if he is eager to win . ..
When a candidate goes to political meetings he usually finds himself just a
lone individual in a large group of candidates for senator, governor, supervisor,
prosecuting attorney, and magistrate.
The major candidates are usually allotted 10 minutes for speech-making.
Judicial candidates are given three minutes. Actually, if they are in luck they
may be allowed to stand up and give a little wave to the crowd.

THE STATE COURT SYSTEM, ON SELECTION, REMOVAL AND RETIREMENT OF JUDGES
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larly, some incumbent candidates are tempted to resort to spectacular publicity stunts and courtroom buffoonery to compensate
for the constraints placed upon them by the judicial code of behavior. The activities of such "judicial Barnums" ultimately
deter courtroom efficiency and damage the public's estimation of
the judicial system." The most objectionable result of this process
of political recruitment and election is the creation of a judiciary
dependent on political sponsors for its position and tenure.2
Judges must be concerned solely with justice, and their actions
should be governed only by the Constitution, the laws, and their
own judgment. More than any other public officials, it is imperative that judges be independent of outside influences and pressures in carrying out their duties. A judiciary concerned with the
"politics" of its behavior can only be that much less concerned

with dispensing justice.
To those who balk at the less savory side of party politics,
supporters of an elected judiciary offer the nonpartisan election
as a proper corrective. However, nonpartisan judicial elections
neither decrease voter manipulation nor increase the quality of
the judiciary. While the nonpartisan election certainly reduces
the instance of political abuse, it also further diminishes the already dim prospect of fair and healthy competition. Former President William Howard Taft, who would eventually become Chief
By staying till the end of the meeting, they will have an opportunity to
mingle with the crowd and perhaps induce someone to take some campaign
literature and bumper stickers.
The round of meetings, picnics, card parties and coffees is the future judge's
daily fare in the three months preceding the primaries . ...
In general elections the judicial candidate is shunted even further into the
background at political meetings. The big guns of the campaign are getting all
the attention now. The most an aspiring judge can hope for is a brief introduction prior to the main speech . ...
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 31, 1970, at 3A, col. 1.
91. HAYNES, supra note 10, at xv.
92. Letter from J. Russell Dye to Patrick W. Dunn, Sept. 28, 1975, at 4 (Mr. Dye, a
recognized specialist in the field of judicial selection, was a court reporter for the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch):
I worked in the state courts in St. Louis under the [Missouri] plan and observed
very little hanky-panky. I listened to old judges tell how, before the plan was
adopted, their antechambers were filled in the morning with political favorseekers. About 1969 I was transferred to St. Louis County where judges were
being politically elected. I was invited at election time to go to fundraising
dinners given for judges seeking re-election. I was profoundly shocked to think
that a judge would have to solicit lawyers, friends, politicians and businessmen
to raise funds for his re-election.
It was degrading. A judge should be beholden to no one. . ..
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Justice of the Supreme Court, explained to the American Bar
Association in 1913 that the nonpartisan ballot actually lowers
the quality of the judiciary by making it possible for individuals
to be elected who could get no political support but who, one way
or another, were able to wage a successful campaign. 3 Most recent studies corroborate Taft's assessment. 4
Assuming, however, that voters are given every theoretical
advantage in an election-how likely is it that they would be
willing and able to select the most qualified judges? The answer
would seem to be: not very. In fact, surveys have shown that the
electorate knows and cares substantially less about judicial candidates than any others on the ballot. 5 One of the most revealing
of these surveys was conducted in 1954 by Elmo Roper and Associates in New York State within a ten-day period immediately
following a statewide election." The poll was conducted in New
93. Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1913). See also
W.H. TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE AND ITS PERILS 193-94
(1914).
94. Vines, Courts as Political and Governmental Agencies, in POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES 266-67 (H. Jacob and K. Vines eds. 1965); Barber, Ohio Judicial
Elections-NonpartisanPremises with PartisanResults, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762 (1971);
Jacob, JudicialInsulation Elections, Direct Participation,and Public Attention to the
Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 801; Ladinsky & Silver, PopularDemocracy and
Judicial Independence, 1967 WIs. L. REV. 128; Moos, Judicial Elections and Partisan
Endorsement of JudicialCandidatesin Minnesota, 35 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 69 (1941); NonPartisanBallot in Oregon, 16 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 44 (1932); Wormuth & Rich, Politics,The
Bar and The Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. REV. 459, 464-66 (1953); Note, Judicial
Selection and Tenure-The Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 263-65 (1973).
95. National Opinion Research Center, NORC No. 71206, Quests. 5, Ila, llb, 11c,
12, July, 1942 (data located at Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown,
Massachusetts) (the results of this survey of Jackson County, Missouri basically parallel
the findings of the 1954 Roper Survey, note 96 infra); Beechen, Can Judicial Elections
Express People's Choice?, 57 JUDICATURE 242 (1974); Brand, Selection of Judges-The
Fiction of Majority Elections, 34 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 136 (1959); Brocksmith, Oklahoma Poll
Shows Court Voters in the Dark, 50 JUDICATURE 134 (1966); N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1975,
at 56, col. 1.; N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1975, at 45, col. 6.
96. Elmo Roper and Associates, RCOM No. 82, Nov. 1954 (data located at the Roper
Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts); E. Roper, A Study of
Voter Awareness of Judicial Candidates in Elections (1954) (prepared for the Committee
on Studies and Surveys of the Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, the Citizen's Committee on Courts and the Institute of Judicial
Administration). For summaries of the survey see Klots, The Selection of Judges and the
Short Ballot, 10 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 103 (1955) and How Much Do Voters Know or Care
About Judicial Candidates?,38 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 141 (1955).
A follow-up survey in 1966 reported similar findings. Elmo Roper and Associates, A
Study of Voter Awareness of Certain Candidates for Office in New York State (1966)
(prepared for the Citizens Union Research Foundation, New York City).
For a similar finding see League of Women Voters of New York survey of voter
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York City, a metropolis; Buffalo, an upstate municipality; and
rural Cayuga County (see Table II). If more voters paid closer
attention to judicial elections or could name the judicial candidates for whom they voted, it is conceivable that party leaders
would be more inclined to insure that their judicial political activities were responsive to the needs of the public.
7
TABLE II

A synthesis of the results of an
Elmo Roper and Associates survey of voter awareness of judicial
elections during the 1954 statewide elections in New York.
Of those who had voted at all,
the percentage that

Cayuga
New York City

Buffalo

County

* voted for any judicial candidate

75%

88%

80%

* paid attention to judicial
candidates before the election

39%

52%

25%

* could name one or more
judicial candidate voted for

19%

30%

4%

less than 1%

less than 1%

* could name a judicial candidate they had not voted for

0%

* could name a court for which
judges had been elected

20%

11%

14%

* either paid no attention to
the election at all or merely
voted for the straight party
ticket

78%

62%

84%

Although the flow of information in judicial elections is stifled by ethical restraints, there is no particular reason to assume
that a lengthy and unfettered discussion of complicated court
cases would inspire the apathetic, nor would it benefit the averknowledge regarding judicial candidates. League of Women Voters of the City of New
York, News Release, Dec. 1, 1964.
It has often been assumed that the negative effects of judicial elections tend to be
localized in the large urban centers. This poll's figures for Cayuga County indicate, however, that the inherent defects in the elective judicial system appear in the rural areas as
well. Furthermore, Elmo Roper and Associates contend that in many instances unique
local circumstances have inflated this survey's figures of judicial awareness, indicating
that the mean voter awareness may actually be even lower than presently indicated in
Table II.
97. Material adapted from Elmo Roper and Associates, RCOM No. 82, Quests. 5, 6,
7, 8a, 8b, 8c, 9a, 9b, 10a, 10b, Nov. 1954 (data located at the Roper Public Opinion
Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts).
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age voter who is unschooled in the intricacies of legal and judicial
affairs.98 As Harold Laski has acknowledged:99
Insofar as its [the elective method's] underlying assumption is
the belief that the people should choose those by whom they are
to be governed, it omits to note the vital fact that the qualifications for judicial office are not such as an undifferentiated public can properly assess.
Admittedly, low voter turnout and an uninformed electorate are
congenital weaknesses of our democratic processes.""0 In judicial
elections, however, voter apathy is so high and public knowledge
so inadequate that even the most scrupulous contest may fail to
produce a qualified judge.
The election of judges does not, therefore, effectively or consistently serve its intended purpose which is to place responsible
and responsive public servants on the bench. ' "' The judicial elective system itself meets none of the nine Niles criteria; it neither
provides for quality control of candidates nor does it engender an
independent judiciary. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
the elective system will produce judges who are able to claim any
of the six character traits indicative of the qualified judicial official. The nature of the elective method of selection is such that
it actually undermines the chances of acquiring such judges, so
that when a highly qualified candidate survives the election process, it is more likely to be an acknowledgment of his or her
98. Ellis, Court Reform in New York State: An Overview for 1975, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV.
663, 667-70 (1975); VanOsdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAW. 167, 168-73
(1967); Wigmore, Pontius Pilateand PopularJudgements, 8 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 47 (1924).
99. Laski, 24 MICH. L. REV., supra note 57, at 531.
100. See generally A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN
VOTER (1960); V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (5th ed. 1964).
101. Furthermore, the elective system does not necessarily place more liberal judges
on the bench, as some have claimed. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the elective
system produces less liberal judges than other selection processes. This is still a highly
speculative subject, but so far most studies have concluded that there seems to be no
direct relationship between the ideological leaning of a court and the method by which
its judges are selected. See generally HAYNES, supra note 10, at 184-216; H. SCHMANDT,
COURTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 36-38 (1968); G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 309-26; notes 114
& 121 infra and accompanying text; Goldman, Voting Behavior in the United States
Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 491 (1975); Jacob, The Effect of

InstitutionalDifferences in the Recruitment Process:The Caseof State Judges, 13 J. PUB.
L. 104 (1964); Nagel, Political PartyAffiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. POL. SCI.
REV. 843 (1961); Nagel, ComparingElected and Appointed JudicialSystems, Sage Profes-

sional Paper in American Politics 04-001 (1973).
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personal stamina rather than a tribute to the system itself." 2
Finally, at a time when judicial resources are severely taxed,
it is worthwhile to note that the process of electing judges is also
an extremely inefficient method of selection. Indeed, much of the
time, money, and energy expended under the elective system is
minimally related, if related at all, to the selection of qualified
judges. These wasteful externalities cause artificially high opportunity costs which have ramifications throughout the entire legal
system. For example, many courts face serious backlogs which
require judicial attention in the courtrooms. The elective system,
however, contains strong incentives for judges, especially during
election years, to campaign rather than hear cases. Such campaign activity, which has been shown to have almost no bearing
on the selection of competent judges, will not improve the quality
of justice and may indeed result in a cost to the system in the
form of further backlogs. Certainly judicial resources could be
used more efficiently and costs distributed more realistically
under an alternative method of selection. 0 3
V.

MISSOURI PLAN

The elective system's major rival is the Missouri plan. Supporters of the latter say that its greatest accomplishment has
been to remove the judiciary from the contamination of politics
by placing the power of judicial selection in the hands of a committee properly structured for the task.0 4 There is general support
throughout the legal profession for this view and for the Missouri
plan itself.'' The selection committee, defenders assert, is able
102. Niles, supra note 11, at 245.
103. See generally H. MANNE, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (1975); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 320-56 (1972); G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW
(1971); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
104. G. Winters & R. Allard, JudicialSelection and Tenure in the United States in
Jones, supra note 3, at 146-77; J. PELTASON, THE MISSOURI PLAN FOR THE SELECTION OF
JUDGES (1945); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 146 (1967); Hyde, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV., supra note 60, at 396.
Note that the terms committee and commission are often used interchangeably by
writers on the subject of judicial selection. To prevent confusion the text of this article
uses the term "committee."
105. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE JUDGES OF NEW YORK-THEIR SELECTION, RETENTION, DISCIPLINE, RETIREMENT AND REMOVAL 23-24 (a Report to the Temporary

Commission on the State Court System, pt. 1, 1972); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE: THE COURTS 65-68 (1967); Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in
Texas, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 430, 497 (1968); Schroeder & Hall, Twenty-Five Years' Experi-
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actively to recruit candidates for the bench, to examine their
qualifications thoroughly, and to compare them critically as the
field is narrowed.'"' It is further claimed that once a nominee is
placed on the bench, this selection system substantially guarantees the judge's independence from the deleterious political influences present under the elective approach. It is also suggested
that the committee, composed of a judge, three members of the
bar, and three lay appointees of the governor,' 7 provides the proper combination of citizen representation and legal expertise for
active deliberations and resolutions based on quality. Since the
committee is a permanent body, its expertise can be refined by
on-going educational programs," 8 its own experience, and the
advice of a professional staff. In fact, proponents assert that the
mere presence of a screening committee is adequate to deter those
candidates who are clearly unqualified. In addition, under this
plan, if the electorate decides later that the committee and the
governor have made an improper choice, it has the option to vote
for dismissal in a special election held after the appointed judge
has been on the bench for one year. The voters may further choose
not to approve a judge for a future term.' 9
The legal community, regrettably, has failed to utilize its
own resources and those of other disciplines-especially political
science, sociology, and history-to examine closely the operation
and ramifications of this plan."0 Lawyers seem to be reticent to
identify shortcomings in a program which in the United States is
ence With Merit Judicial Selection in Missouri, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1088 (1966); Watson,

Missouri Lawyers Evaluatethe Merit Planfor Selection and Tenure of Judges, 52 A.B.A.J.
539, 540 (1966); Note, JudicialSelection in New York: A Need for a Change, 3 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 605, 616-17 (1975); Comment, 9 Amz. L. REV. 296, 301-04 (1967). See notes
67 & 68 supra and accompanying text; Table 1, at p. 284 supra.
106. Niles, supra note 11, at 247.
107. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
108. E.g., Lowe, The NebraskaInstitutefor Judicial Nominating Commissioners,51
J. Am. JUD. SOC'Y 351 (1968). The following is an example of material used by one such
committee in its educational program: READING MATERIALS: IOWA JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONER'S INSTITUTE (1972) (materials from the Institute meeting on May 25 and 26,
1972 in Des Moines, Iowa, prepared by the American Judicature Society).
109. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.

110. H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: COURTS, LAWYERS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
206-07 (1965); See generally Vanderbilt, Forward to F. AUMANN, THE INSTRUMENTALITIES
OF JUSTICE: THEIR FORMS, FUNCTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS at v-vi (1956); Glueck, The Social
Sciences and Scientific Method in the Administration of Justice, 167 ANNALS 106 (1933);
Tanenhaus, The Uses and Limitations of Social Science Methods in Analyzing Judicial
Behavior (1956) (prepared for delivery before the American Political Science Association,
Sept. 7, 1956).
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offered as the only practical alternative to the elective system.
This "hands-off' treatment of the Missouri plan has seriously
retarded efforts to reform the judicial selection process.
One would expect the debate over the efficacy of the different
methods of selection to concentrate on which produces the most
highly qualified judges. Because there has been virtually no vigorous scrutiny of the various selection systems, however, the discussion has taken other forms. The most prevalent criticism of the
Missouri plan has been that it provides for elitist control of the
judiciary by establishing an undemocratic selection committee
which instinctively favors a conservative class of lawyers at the
expense of the rest of the profession. Detractors explain that
under the plan the judicial selection process has merely been
moved to a different and much smaller political arena, and that
control over the judiciary has been narrowed to the bar, the state
judiciary, and the governor."'
If utilized to support a return to the elective system, the
foregoing argument is specious since the elective system has been
shown to be singularly undemocratic. However, the fear that the
Missouri plan produces judges from only a very narrow spectrum
of the profession raises the same serious concerns of class control
and public dissatisfaction that characterized much of the criticism of judicial appointment in this country in the 1830's and
1840's.112 If the Missouri program is only an elaborate recasting
of those previous appointive systems then certainly it is a most
cruel hoax. The late Charles E. Clark of the United States Court
''3
of Appeals warned of these dangers when he wrote:
[T]he Missouri plan . . . [is supported] without notation of
the dangers of a unique bias toward professional competence.
Since in our economy the rewards of professional competence
are, quite naturally and properly, the confidence of an employ11. See, e.g., note 72supra; Wormuth & Rich, 3 UTAH L. REV., supra note 94, at 461:
The commission is composed of outstanding lawyers who are able to nominate
to the governor a panel of candidates all possessed of integrity, technical competence, and judicial balance. Put together, of course, these two arguments are the
arguments for aristocracy. The people are not qualified to choose their own
governors, nor are the officers they elect qualified to do so for them. Rather their
judges would be chosen for them by the wise, the virtuous, and the well-born.
In this case, the wise, virtuous, and well-born will be the lawyers of the state,
and more particularly the leaders of the state bar association.
112. See notes 35, 37 & 39 supra.
113. Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraintand Freedom in the
Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 272 (1961).
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ment by all the settled institutions of our society-the banks,
the insurance companies, the mammoth business combines, and
so on-the imbalance toward mere preservation of the status
quo and notably its aristocratic elements is a potential danger
for the courts. Thus if an executive can make his judicial choice
only from a limited roster supplied him by a commission composed of the successful and conservative members of the community, then it is obvious that no one who deviates from the
professional norm-labor lawyers, for example-need apply.

With very little analysis available comparing the various
selection systems and the judges they produce, it is impossible to
respond with any certainty to the claim that the Missouri plan
provides for elitist control of the judiciary."' Recent data on judicial selection committees, as is discussed below, indicate that
these committees are narrowly based and suggest that the question of elitist control should be the subject of future inquiry. In
defense of the Missouri system, however, it is important to note
that in their exhaustive study of its operation in the State of
Missouri in the 1960's, Richard Watson and Ronald Downing
found (as summarized by the U.S. Advisory Commission) that:" 5
Contrary to expectations, there is a greater tendency for
graduates of night law schools-not of prestigious institutions-to ascend to the bench than under the preceding elective
system." 6
114. Among the writings available touching on various aspects of judicial character
and elitism are: H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
JUDICIAL ROLE (1971); Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of the Judges-Reconsidered,6 LAW & Soc. REV. 579 (1972); Crockett, JudicialSelection and the Black Experience, 58 JUDICATURE 438 (1975); Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making,79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966); Jacob, The Effect
of InstitutionalDifferences in the Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J.
PUB. L. 104 (1964); Levine, UrbanPolitics and JudicialBehavior, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 193
(1972); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333
(1962); Nagel, Testing Relations Between JudicialCharacteristicsand JudicialDecision
Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425 (1962); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges'
Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 843 (1961); Niles, supra note 11; Watson, Downing &
Speigel, Bar Politics,JudicialSelection and the Representationof Social Interests,61 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 54 (1967); Letter from W. St. John Garwood to the Editor, in 59 JUDICATURE
57-58 (1975).
115. U. S.

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL

RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 197 (1971) (summarizing
Downing findings); WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 343-48.

the Watson and

116. It has long been charged that the Missouri plan favors graduates from prestigious law schools. Such was the gist of this ditty, sung by New York Judge James Garrett
Wallace some time ago in a judicial minstrel show. Lyrics from "Wallace's Third
Party"-A Minstrel Show 8, 9 (privately printed 1948) also in Clark & Trubek, 71 YALE
L.J., supra note 113, at 273 n.59:
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"locals"

rather

than

The majority are affiliated with the majority party.
They are older, more mature than judges previously selected by election.
Appellate judges selected have had more service at the
lower levels than previously.
Appointees tend to have prior experience in law enforcement, particularly as prosecutors.
They are not more conservative than those chosen by election.
They are better judges than their predecessors in terms of
knowledge of the law, open-mindedness, common sense, courtesy, and hard work.

Closely related to the charge that the Missouri plan is elitist,
is the suggestion that the Missouri selection committees are unable to produce a judiciary which is representative of the pluralistic interests of the society-at-large.1 1" This criticism must be con"Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
When Wall Street lawyers all judicial candidates will scan
If you're not from Fair Old Harvard,
They will toss you in the can....
Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
It won't be served with sauerkraut nor sauce Italian.
There'll be no corned beef and cabbage,
And spaghetti they will ban;
There'll be no such dish
As gefilte fish
On the Old Missouri Plan."
However, when Watson and Downing conducted their study this claim was not substantiated:
No Harvard man has been chosen for either the circuit or the appellate benches in
Missouri; the same is true of lawyers from the national prestige law schools of Yale
and Columbia as well. Moreover, only one Chicago man and three Michigan men
have made it. In fact the trend has been in the other direction, that is, there has been
a greater tendency for graduates of night law schools to ascend to the bench ....
WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 343.
At least one commentator, Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey, who was alarmed by this
finding, observed that the Missouri plan might actually be decreasing the number of truly
outstanding judges and suggested that there should be more Harvard Law School graduates on the bench. Wilkey, Judicial Background and Decision-Making, 108 TIDSKRIFr,
UTGIVEN AV JURIDISKA FORENINGEN 317, 336 (1972).
117. See notes 114 supra, 121 infra and accompanying text; REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY
COMMISSION ON THE NEW YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM,. . . AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, PART II
53 (1973).
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sidered carefully, for judges should be selected on the basis of
over-all ability, and not as representatives of a particular viewpoint or segment of the population."'8 Judges do, nevertheless,
affect social policy, and one measure of a judge's competence is
the ability of that judge to relate positively to the interests and
concerns of the litigants before the bench. The argument that the
Missouri plan yields judges unrepresentative of the society's interests is, therefore, deserving of further scrutiny. Once again
pertinent data is not available. The potential problem can be
appreciated, however, by considering the composition of the
selection committees.
Allan Ashman and James J. Alfini's important study of Missouri plan judicial selection committees throughout the country
found their composition to be highly unrepresentative." 9 Of the
371 committee members who responded to their survey, 97.8 percent were white and 89.6 percent were male.' 21 Certainly the pauc-

ity of women and blacks in the legal profession largely accounts
for these figures,' 2' but it does not explain why only 3.3 percent
118. Those who support the elective system contend that elected judges are representative of their constituencies, but more often than not this has meant representative
of the concerns of the political leadership and the bar associations and not of the citizens
as a whole.
119. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 38-40. Their study involved extensive interviews with members of judicial selection committees in most states with Missouri plans.
Allan Ashman is the Director and James J. Alfini is Assistant Director of Research for
the American Judicature Society.
120. Id. at 38.

121. Id. at 38, 39. See

CENTER FOR CLINICAL LEGAL STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW, PROFILES IN BLAcK-IN LAW (C. Saunders ed. 1971); Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, A Preliminary Report of the Experiences of the Minority
Judiciary, 18 HOWARD L.J. 495 (1975); Crockett, Racism in the Courts, 20 J. PUB. L. 385
(1971); Crockett, The Role of the Black Judge, 20 J. PUB. L. 391 (1971); Leonard, The
Development of the Black Bar, 407 ANNALS 134 (1973); Mosher, Few Blacks Make the
Bench, The National Observer, Dec. 1, 1969, at 26; Parker & Stebman, Legal Education
For Blacks, 407 ANNALS 144 (1973); Pool, Black Judges, ESSENCE, Nov. 1971, at 57; Shuman, A Black Lawyers Study, 16 HOWARD L.J. 225 (1971). See The Black Judge in America: A Statistical Profile, 57 JUDICATURE 18 (1973):
There are still alarmingly few black lawyers in the country, although the
number is rising. Recent statistics indicate that only about 4,000 of the nation's
325,000 attorneys are black. Black attorneys constitute slightly more than one
percent of the total number of attorneys even though blacks represent approximately twelve percent of the American population. With these statistics in
mind, it comes as no great surprise that there are few black judges. At the time
of our survey [1971-19721 there were 475 federal judges, of whom 31, or almost
seven percent, were black. Of 21,294 full and part time state and city judges,
only 255 were black, or slightly more than one percent.
In 1970 only 2.8 percent of all lawyers in the United States were women. AMERICAN
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of the lay commissioners were non-white and only 22.3 percent
were women.'22 In addition, among the lay members of the selection committees surveyed, business and banking executives predominated (27.1 percent) with less input by educators (7.8 percent), journalists (4.8 percent), and medical professionals (3.6
percent). 13 The prevalence of these particular interests on the
selection committees raises very serious doubts about the commissions' ability to produce a judiciary sensitive to all interests
of the general public. It is important to note, however, that since
the Ashman and Alfini study in 1973, and very probably because
of the disturbing findings of that valuable work, efforts have been
made throughout the country to appoint more women and minor2
ity members to the selection committees.' 1
Moreover, there is evidence to show that the lay members
who theoretically represent the general public during
deliberations tend to defer to the views of the governor who appointed them and are often intimidated by lawyer members. This
then allows the bar and the governor further to dominate the
proceedings. Watson and Downing as well as Ashman and Alfini
discovered this problem to exist under the Missouri plan and
recommended the inclusion of strong, independent lay members
on the selection committees and energetic lawyer-lay interaction
2
during the selection process.' 1
Furthermore, the electorate has proven to be no more capaBAR FOUNDATION, THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 5 (1972); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, WOMEN LAWYERS: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 3

(1973).

The plan presented in Section VI is structured to involve more women and blacks in
the judicial selection process.
122. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 38-39.
123. Id. at 39. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 136-37:
[T]he largest number of lay nominating commissioners have been spokesmen
for the values of the business community. Drawn entirely from banking, commerce, and industrial firms, they have generally shared the values of the corporate lawyers serving on the nominating commission, and have usually deferred
to the lawyer commissioners and the presiding judge for assessment of the legal
abilities of judicial candidates. In addition, these lay commissioners occasionally have turned for advice to the legal counsel employed by their own business

firms.
124. Interview with Edward J. Schoenbaum, Director of Programs and Services, the
American Judicature Society, in Chicago, Oct. 7, 1975.
125. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 25-27, 70-85; WATSON & DOWNING, supra note
13, at 43-48, 88-91, 136-38, 186-87. These studies also found that if their independence is

not stifled, lay members can not only bring fresh perspectives to the problem of judicial
selection, but can also mediate and evaluate the often diverse opinions of the lawyer

members.
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ble of removing a bad judge than it was of electing a good one.
The Missouri plan's special one-year retention election and its
approval election have not been found to be very successful ways
in which to monitor the judicial selection process.' The general
public cannot usually assess a judge's competence in one year
and, as a result, rarely votes for dismissal. The problem here is
that once a judge has been appointed, the Missouri plan's selection system shifts over to an elective process which raises the
unsavory spectre of judicial elections discussed previously.
Finally, there is general agreement that the Missouri plan
has not eliminated politics from the selection process but only
altered its form. 2 The Governor's choice of committee members
and final appointive power is not immune from political pressures; the bar, in its selection of commissioners, is similarly subject to political rivalries. It is equally impossible for the committee itself to be entirely isolated from the political realities of the
outside world. The ultimate question is not, however, whether
politics should play a part in judicial selection, for it will under
any system except divine revelation, but rather whether the Missouri plan so channels today's political energy as to select the best
possible judiciary.
The Missouri system is no doubt better equipped than the
elective system to produce judges who meet the six basic character qualifications-its selection committee specifically sets up a
control mechanism to monitor these criteria. In addition, the
Missouri plan meets many of the Niles criteria for quality screening and recruitment of judicial candidates. Serious doubts remain, however, about the independence of the plan's appointing
authority, the power of the organized bar, the debilitating effect
of the political system on the process as a whole, and the extent
to which the Missouri plan is capable of producing a judiciary
sensitive to the concerns of the varied segments of the community. Finally, although the malignancies in the elective system
have been repeatedly identified, there has been little hard evidence to indicate that the Missouri plan is capable of selecting a
126. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 241-57; Ellis, supra note 90, at 674-75;
Moran, Counter-"MissouriPlan" for Method of Selecting Judges, 32 FLA. B.J. 471, 47274 (1958); Comment, Courts: Selection for the Court of Last Resort, 28 OKLA. L.R. 359
(1975).
127. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 71; Goldman, AmericanJudges: Their Selection, Tenure, Variety and Quality, 61 CURRNFT HISTORY 2-4 (1971); Watson, Downing &
Spiegel, Bar Politics,JudicialSelection and the Representationof Social Interests, 61 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 54 (1967).
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more qualified judiciary. Surely these concerns should compel
judicial reformers to begin to move away from unquestioning devotion to the Missouri system and to progress toward the creation
of a different and better mode of judicial selection.
VI.

A

PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM

The following is a proposal for improving judicial selection
which utilizes the basic appointive framework of the Missouri
plan, but which injects into that original system certain specific
reforms designed to rectify its fundamental weaknesses. In short,
this reform proposal seeks to meet all, not merely some, of the
nine Niles criteria for a highly qualified and independent judiciary. While the plan outlined here was conceived with statewide
judicial selection in mind, its basic concepts can easily be
adapted to other judicial levels.
The Selection Committee, as illustrated in Table HI, would
consist of eleven individuals-six of whom would be lawyers and
five of whom would be lay persons-to be chosen in the following
manner: the State Judicial Conference' 8 (or where applicable the
State Supreme Court) would appoint one lawyer who is not a
member of the Conference; the State Senate majority and minority leaders would each appoint one lawyer; and the State Bar
Association would elect two lawyers from its membership. Similarly, the State Judicial Conference would appoint one lay person, again not from its own membership; and the State House
majority and minority leaders would each appoint one lay person.
The Governor would appoint two lay persons and one lawyer-only two of whom may belong to the Governor's political
party.
This method of appointing a Selection Committee recognizes
that politics cannot be exorcized from the judicial selection process. 29 The plan therefore utilizes the positive forces of an eclectic
society by opening the Selection Committee to the natural political interaction of varied interests which have a legitimate stake
in producing the most proficient judiciary. The Selection Committee would be chosen in such a way that it would not be subject
to the power politics of the elective system, nor be stifled by the
restricted composition that characterizes the Missouri commit128. Many states have a judicial council made up of all of the judges in the state and
chaired by the chief justice of the supreme court. For jurisdictions without such an organization, the appointments in the plan designated for the judicial council should be made
by the membership of the highest court in the state.
129. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13; WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13.
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tees. In addition, this plan includes in the choice of the Selection
Committee various groups whose support is important if such a
plan is ever to be implemented.
The organized bar and the governor unquestionably have a
role to play in judicial selection, but unlike the Missouri plan,
this system is designed to prevent them from dominating, and
possibly balkanizing, the proceedings. Hence, their combined
appointments to the Selection Committee do not constitute a
majority. To preserve the valuable input of the judiciary, the
Judicial Conference is allowed two appointments, but to prevent
potential domination by a member of the court,130 those two appointees may not be Conference members. Since the leaders of
the House and Senate are accountable to their colleagues in the
legislature as well as to their constituents, their appointments
would hopefully provide increased electoral representation on the
Committee. The one-lawyer majority on the Committee recognizes the professional competence required for proper judicial
selection. Because the lay members in this plan represent more
substantial and disparate interests in the selection process than
they do under the Missouri system, they can be expected to be
TABLE IlI
This table illustrates the manner
in which the eleven members of
the Judicial Selection Committee
would be chosen under the proposal.
Lawyer

Nonlawyer

1. State Judicial Conference appoints (other
than from its own membership):

1

1

2. State House majority leader appoints:

-

1

3. State House minority leader appoints:

-

1

4. State Senate majority leader appoints:

1

-

5. State Senate minority leader appoints:

1

-

6. State Bar Association elects from its
membership:

2

-

7. Governor appoints (one from the opposing
political party):

1

2

6

5

Total

130. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 182-86.
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stronger and more independent members of the Committee and
not subject, therefore, to domination by the lawyer members.
Such a lawyer-lay combination should assure the spirited interaction between the various members of the Committee which
Watson and Downing as well as Ashman and Alfini thought essential to quality judicial selection, but which they found too
often lacking under the Missouri formula. 3 '
To encourage broader representation in the choice of the
Committee and the judiciary, the legislative act establishing the
proposed system should set specific affirmative guidelines for the
individuals involved in the process. Such legislation should expressly direct the appointing authorities to make a special effort
to choose individuals for the Selection Committee who are sensitive to the concerns of the electorate and who also represent the
various geographic areas within the jurisdiction. This concern for
geographic representation is especially important in a statewide
committee where it is necessary to recruit candidates from all
areas of the state. If all Committee members were from one or two
major population areas, they might be inclined to concentrate
recruiting activities in those areas with which they were most
familiar-at the expense of the rest of the state. Furthermore,
members of the Selection Committee should expressly be held to
owe a fiduciary duty to the public when recruiting and nominating judicial candidates. Such directives would be helpful in producing a Selection Committee that is not elitist and which is
1
sensitive to the needs of the society-at-large. 32
131, See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
132. Crockett, Judicial Selection and the Black Experience, 58 JUDICATURE 438
(1975); Letter from Judge Anthony P. Wartnik to the Editor, in 59 JUDICATURE 57 (1975).
Such affirmative guidance as suggested here could be most helpful in developing a
more broadly-based judiciary. See, e.g., Rosenman, supra note 68, at 91-92:
The [New York City] Mayor's [judicial selection] committee has tried also
to pay attention to the one political motive which, in my view, has been an asset
of the elective system-the recognition of ethnic and other groups of the community in the lists which it has submitted. I am not suggesting that a man
should be appointed to judicial office merely because he belongs to some particular ethnic, religious or other group. But practical politics require that a man
be not overlooked merely because he belongs to one of those groups-and this
realism the committee has sought to preserve in its lists of recommendations.
As a result, the Mayor has been able to make his appointments from all such
groups-religious, racial and foreign born.
Under this plan there are more opportunities for minority members to reach the bench
than under other approaches. For example, under the elective system minority candidates
are usually placed on the ballot only in areas of strong minority concentration. However,
this plan requires no such "quid pro quo" for a lawyer from a minority community to be
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A number of steps should be taken to enhance the independence and-efficiency of this Selection Committee so that it will not
be susceptible to the outside extraneous influences that have
jeopardized the operation of the Missouri and elective systems.' 3
First, the charter members should establish regulations governing
the Committee's operation and these rules would remain in force
until amended by a majority of the Committee members.131 Too
often committees under the Missouri plan proceed without
established rules, and this fact has many times led to confusion,
inefficiency, and the use of improper discretion on the part of
13 5
committee members.
One major issue that should be addressed in the enabling
legislation concerns the confidentiality of Committee proceedings. In order to encourage the free exchange of information and
inspire lawyers to participate in the selection process without fear
of professional or personal embarrassment, the deliberations and
files of the Committee should be exempt from the relevant state
information acts. Once the Committee has submitted its choices
to the Governor, however, the public has a legitimate interest in
the names and qualifications of those selected. That information
will enable the public to analyze more accurately the work of the
Committee and to hold the Governor accountable for the final
nominee. Judicial candidates who survive to the final list should
not object to having their names made public, nor should they
desire to escape public scrutiny at these final and crucial stages
of selection.
The Committee budget should be a free and separate item
in the state budget and should be presented to the legislature as
such. This step is primarily intended to prevent the Governor-who may be unhappy with the names submitted for nomination-from attempting to affect the work of the Committee by
reducing its budget. Such gubernatorial action would be possible
if the Committee were funded through an executive department.
Furthermore, if the level and independence of the budget lines for
the Committee are clearly delineated in the initial legislation,
considered for the bench. Under the Missouri plan the selection committees are so narrowly structured that it would be very hard for minority candidates to come to their
attention. In addition, the proposed system is designed to produce a judiciary of the
highest possible quality which would be of benefit to all groups in the society.
133. See Sections IV and V supra; ASHMAN & ALMNI, supra note 13, at 70-85.
134. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 40-60; Hunter, The JudicialNomination Commission, 52 JUDICATURE 370 (1969).
135. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at 40-45.
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then the possibility of its finances being manipulated not only by
the Governor, but also by the legislature, will be considerably
reduced.
In addition, the Committee's budget should provide for a
small, salaried, full-time professional staff-including an investigative arm with subpoena powers-that works exclusively for
the Committee's benefit. 36 The Missouri plan effectuates an
open and active recruitment of judicial candidates and then
allows for comparative judgments as the names are pared down
to three. This basic structure is retained here. Many Missouri
systems do not, however, utilize the necessary resources to
capitalize adequately on these features, and as a result, many of
their benefits are lost. The proposed plan demands, therefore,
that adequate resources be allocated to the vigorous recruitment
and necessary investigation of the candidates. It is during this
phase that the less qualified candidates are identified and separated from the field. Substantial financial outlays during the
selection process provide much higher returns than they would
later on since it is extremely difficult to remove an unqualified
judge from the bench.
Furthermore, no Committee member should be permitted to
hold a simultaneous judicial, governmental, or political office,
although such previous employment would not bar an appointee
from service. This provision takes advantage of the backgrounds
of the potential members of the Committee, but at the same time
prevents the most obvious conflicts of interest. The more subtle
conflicts would best be handled by a Committee ethical code
which should be developed as more difficult ethical problems
present themselves during the selection process.
Moreover, because judicial selection must be an on-going
process, the Committee should meet at least once a month to
deliberate and develop reports on eligible candidates in preparation for vacancies on the bench. Once the Committee has been
in operation for a few years it should have a rather extensive file
on potential nominees. Since most vacancies can be predicted,
the Committee should prepare for those situations well before the
actual declaration of the vacancy. In fulfilling this duty the Committee must be careful to keep its investigations within proper
bounds, especially when it is considering a sitting judge either for
136.
COURTS

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

148-49 (1973).
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possible reappointment or elevation. In this regard, the Committee should evaluate the performance of judges on the bench
only in anticipation of a specific vacancy and with the written
permission of the judge involved.' 31 If it is to be done, judicial
evaluation must be accomplished by a body totally separate from
the Selection Committee. The Committee's major job is judicial
selection, not judicial review. Once a judge is selected, that judge
should be completely free of any relationship with the Committee. A hallmark of this sytem must be judicial independence.
Finally, Committee members should serve staggered fiveyear terms, and should not be eligible for reappointment. This
safeguard is to prevent a particular coalition from dominating the
proceedings. An attempt to further structure the Committee or
to balance it more politically would probably be overly constrictive on the appointing authorities. The regular turnover of the
appointing and Committee personnel will provide for adequate
diversity.
Once the Committee is set up, the selection process would
proceed as follows: within 30 days of the declaration of a vacancy,
the Committee would submit the names of 3 judicial candidates
to the Governor with a comprehensive report on each individual
attached. The Governor would then have 10 days in which to
choose one of those candidates and send the nomination to the
combined House and Senate Judiciary Committees along with
the Selection Committee report and a Governor's report if desired. If so inclined, the Governor might send the candidates'
names back to the Selection Committee for reconsideration. In
this case, the latter would resubmit three names (either new candidates, the original candidates, or any combination thereof) to
the Governor within 10 days. The Governor would then have 10
days in which to choose one of the names and send it on to the
Judiciary Committees. Once the candidate's name reaches the
combined Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the selection
process would continue thusly: the Judiciary Committees would
hold a joint open hearing on the nomination within 20 days of
137. An interesting ethical question is raised by considering the proper relationship
between an attorney on the Committee and a judge under consideration for possible
nomination. The selection process may take some time. During that period, can the lawyer

appear before that judge? What if the lawyer, during the course of a trial before that judge,
discovers that the judge's name will be coming before the Committee? Similarly, what is

the relationship between the lay members and the judge, and generally, between the
members of the Committee and the candidates they are considering?
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receiving the candidate's name and would submit a report of the
hearing to the full House and Senate. Within 20 days of receiving
the Judiciary Committees' report-or if the houses are not in
session, 20 days after they reconvene-the joint houses would vote
on the nomination. To become official, the appointment must
pass by a vote of the majority of both houses. The period of
legislative deliberation might be extended one-and only
one-20-day period by the passage of an appropriate resolution
asking for more time to consider the nomination. If at the end of
this time the nomination has been rejected, or if no judgment has
been passed one way or the other, the nomination is dead and the
selection process would begin again with the Selection Committee. In this event, the Governor is empowered to make an interim
appointment to the bench until a permanent selection is made.
This process is illustrated in Table IV.
The proposal outlined here has many advantages over both
the elective system and the Missouri plan, although it contains
elements of both. This plan is substantially more open and less,
restrictive than the Missouri system, but it also contains provisions which strengthen and improve the quality control aspects
of the latter plan. The regulation which allows the Governor to
return the names to the Committee for further consideration provides flexibility to the process and stresses the principle that
judicial selection is a partnership among a number of interests,
not just the purview of a few. In most cases the Committee will
narrow a large field to the three finalists. When the list comes
back from the Governor they can then reconsider the names in
light of the Governor's comments. The Committee can then either resubmit the same names, or make changes. The names on
the second list should not represent any lessening of quality, but
rather a possibly different emphasis. The Governor must, in any
case, make a final choice from the last list, and the openness of
the process will allow the public to hold the Committee and the
Governor accountable in a way impossible under the closed deliberations of the Missouri plan. 3 '
138. Allan Ashman and James J. Alfini feel that this "kick-back" provision might
lead to a complex set of "games" between the Committee and the Governor which would
only serve to lessen the quality of the final product and possibly undermine the public
support for the program. To accomplish the same purpose as the "kick-back" provision
without these possible side effects, Allan Ashman suggests having the Committee submit
more than three names, possibly up to ten, which would then give the Governor more
flexibility in the final selection. Although this suggestion is an alternative way to add
flexibility to the selection system, it would seem to subtract from the quality control
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TABLE IV
This table illustrates the alternative methods of nomination and
appointment under this judicial
selection proposal.
I.

SELECTION COMMITTEE
within thirty days of a vacancy
would send three names to the

GOVERNOR
who would have ten days to nominate one of these names and send it
to the

4

JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
II. SELECTION COMMITTEE
within thirty days of a vacancy
would send three names to the

SELECTION COMMITTEE
who within ten days would
again send three names
(either new names or former
nominees, or any combination
thereof) to the

GOVERNOR
who would have ten days to nominate one of these names or send the
names back for reconsideration
to the
GOVERNOR
who would have ten days to nominate one of these names and send
it to the

JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
JUDICIARY COMMITTEES Awould hold a joint public hearing within twenty
days of the nomination and send a report of the
hearing to the full House and Senate
HOUSE-SENATE
within twenty days of receiving the Judiciary Committees' report (if the
houses are in session or within twenty days after the houses have reconvened) the houses would vote on the nomination. To become official the
appointment would have to pass by a majority vote in both houses. The
period of legislative consideration might be extended only one twenty-day
period by the passage of an appropriate resolution asking for more time for
consideration of the nominee. If the nominee is rejected or if the houses do
not act at the end of this time, the nomination would be dead and the judicial selection process would begin again; however, the Governor is empowered to make an interim appointment to the court until a final selection
is made.
inherent in narrowing the field to three names. Interview with Allan Ashman and James
J. Alfini, Director and Assistant Director of Research for the American Judicature Society,
in Chicago, Oct. 6, 1975.
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The public hearing and the legislative confirmation vote is
another attempt to open the selection process to a wider segment
of the population than has had a part in either the elective system
or the Missouri plan."9 Although the Roper survey in Table II
showed very little public interest in judicial selection generally,
there is a small but concerned group of citizens who are very
interested in the judiciary and who should have an opportunity
to participate in the selection system via the public hearing. The
hearing also allows the elected representatives an opportunity to
question the nominee and others in an effort to make further
investigation of the candidate's qualifications. On the federal
level these hearings have been a very useful mode of obtaining
information pertinent to the judicial appointment that had not
been made available through other mechanisms. It should also be
noted that in most judicial selection plans involving legislative
approval, the Senate is the determinative body. 4 ' The inclusion
of the House-which in most states is the more representative
body-should allow for the addition of more viewpoints to the
selection process.
The selection system as a whole, while a potentially speedy
process, contains a number of safety measures to arrest overly
hasty appointments and to assure that highly qualified candidates are placed on the bench. Thirty days for the Selection Committee to submit its three names is more than adequate since the
Committee should regularly be reviewing names for potential
vacancies. Since the choice of the Governor is limited to just 3
names, 10 days is enough time for selection. If the names are sent
back to the Committee, 10 days is a sufficient time for reconsideration, because the basic ground work has already been completed. The time constraints for legislative consideration are
fairly tight in order to prevent a deleterious political atmosphere
from mounting, thus unreasonably delaying the proceedings. The
time periods are, however, more than adequate to allow for a full
and proper consideration of the nominee.
This proposal does not contain any provisions for a retention
election once an appointment becomes confirmed. Experience
has shown that such elections have not proved to be a practical
evaluative tool."' It is therefore imperative that when a jurisdic139. See Sections IV and V supra.
140. See Appendix VI and the constitutions and statutes cited therein.
141. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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tion initiates a plan such as this one, it also adopt strict tenure
and discipline procedures.112 Finally, this is a flexible plan which
is capable of surviving changes in the political and social environment-a fact that should not, however, preclude careful and continual monitoring of the plan to assure that it fulfills its basic
objectives.
This proposal complies with all the Niles criteria for an
independent, competent, and representative selection system,
and is structured to nominate judges who possess the appropriate
personal qualifications discussed in Section II. In addition, institutionalization of this system is facilitated by the fact that the
plan incorporates diverse interests into the selection process.
When more people have a stake in a new plan for judicial
selection reform, it is easier for such a plan to gain political and
public support and, hence, it is more likely to be implemented.
Some might suggest that a plan concerned with its implementation will be that much less concerned with considerations of quality. This plan allows, however, for the meaningful participation
of the various segments of society important for implementation,
and at the same time produces a nominee whose mettle has been
more strenuously tested for quality than under any previous plan.
VII.

CHARTING A COURSE FOR ACTION

Conceiving a better plan for selecting judges is only the beginning of the reforming process. Means must be developed by
which the plan can be actively implemented. Judicial selection
cannot be improved by mere discussion, nor will theoretical constructs alone produce better judges.
There is an overwhelming need for responsible action in this
area of judicial reform." 3 Moreover, lawyers have a special obliga142. One criticism of the Missouri plan applicable here is that when the plan is first
implemented it freezes into office the judges chosen in political elections. Some have
suggested removing all of these elected judges and replacing them with judges selected
under the operation of the new plan. This proposal is politically unfeasible for it would
lose support for the plan from many sitting elected judges, and it would also allow one
governor to make a large number of appointments. The incompetent judges who would
be assured life tenure under this plan should he removed by discipline procedures. Natural
attrition over the years will eventually allow judges chosen under the plan to replace the
elected judges.
143. See CONSENSUS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND COURT
ADMINISTRATION (1959) (sponsored by the American Bar Association, the Institute of

Judicial Administration, and the American Judicature Society, held in Chicago, Nov. 2224, 1959); CONSENSUS STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE JUDICIARY (1971)

(held in Williamsburg, Virginia on Mar. 11-14, 1971); THE FINAL REPORT
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tion to lead the charge. The legal profession has a stake in both
the political and the judicial worlds, and thus it is in a unique
position to observe the abuses of the judiciary and to seek constructive corrective measures. Lawyers, as guardians of the law,
not only have a duty to society to monitor judicial behavior, but
they have a responsibility to themselves as well, since the incompetent judge hurts lawyers, their clients, and the prestige of the
profession. "I
Lawyers have generally been disinclined to institutionalize
proposed judicial reforms and have, unfortunately, exhibited a
distinct hesitancy to utilize the political process as an instrument
of legal and social change."' As a result, the campaigns which the
legal community have launched for the cause of improving judicial selection have been sporadic, unimaginative, and unprofessional-hence, for the most part, they have also been unsuccessful., 46
In the words of Arthur Vanderbilt, "judicial reform is no
sport for the shortwinded .....""' Indeed, unenergetic and
poorly administered campaign efforts easily fall prey to those
with a vested interest in the established system who are many
times capable of mounting a stronger and better organized attack. To stress the weaknesses in the past judicial selection reAMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION

(1965) (held in

Harriman, New York from Apr. 29-May 2, 1965); LOWE, supra note 12; Winters & Lowe,
supra note 59; THE SELECTION AND DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES (R. Spector ed. 1975) (published
by the Center for the Study of Constitutional Government, Worchester State College,
Worchester, Massachusetts and directed primarily toward judicial selection reform in
Massachusetts); VIRGINIA CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT PAPERS AND
CONCLUSIONS (1972) (held in Williamsburg, Virginia, Jan. 12-13, 1972); Heflin, The Time
Is Now, 55 JUDICATURE 70 (1971); Winters, JudicialSelection Reform Today, 21 KY. S.B.J.
127 (1957); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1974, at 34, col. 1.
144. See generally A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955); A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION

(1956); Morris,

Ethics for the Organized Bar, 59 JUDICATURE 84 (1975); Vanderbilt, Some Principles of
JudicialAdministration, 12 U. PITT. L. REV. 333 (1951).
145. Costikyan, The Lawyer As Politician, 22 RECORD of N.Y.C.B.A. 447, 453-54
(1967).
146. See, e.g., Barkdull, Analysis of Ohio Vote on Appointive Judiciary, 22 J. Am.
JUD. Soc'v 197 (1939); B. COOK, THE PARADOX OF JUDICIAL REFORM: THE KANSAS EXPERIENCE, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY REPORT

No. 29 (1970); Winters, The New Mexico

Judicial Selection Campaign, 35 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 166 (1952). Although there have been
quite a number of successful judicial selection reform efforts, see note 148 infra, these were
usually successful only after a number of earlier defeats. Furthermore, there are a large
number of states where judicial selection reform has yet to achieve a victory. See Appendix
VI infra.
147. Vanderbilt, Introduction to MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION at
xix (A. Vanderbilt ed. 1949).
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form efforts is not to deny that some of them have been successful. Most of these victories, however, were more the product of
fortuitous events and judicial scandals than the result of carefully
executed campaigns.1 8 It is imperative, therefore, that reformers
of judicial selection unite solidly behind a common goal of affirmative action and that they persistently pursue-from start to finish-the legal implementation of their selection platform.
The reform plan itself 49 should, as far as possible: (1) synthesize the benefits and eliminate the weaknesses of the established systems of selection; 5 ' (2) meet the Niles criteria; (3) produce judges who meet the six character criteria discussed in Section II; and (4) be able to elicit widespread political support from
the electorate. With regard to the establishment of such a plan,
it is critical that all interested parties join together to draw up a
148. See generally AMERICAN

JUDICATURE SOCIETY, THE BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE PUB-

(1974) (these four addresses
delivered during the 1974 National Conference of Bar Presidents describe how judicial
improvements were made in Alabama, Arizona, Maryland, and Florida through the combined efforts of the bar, the bench, and lay citizens; ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 13, at
170-78; Iowa Shows the Nation It Can Be Done, in Winter & Lowe, supra note 59, at § V,
18-23; Letter to the Honorable John Perry Wood from H. B. Marshall, Apr. 15, 1941, in
Winters & Lowe, supra note 59, at § V, 24-30 (Mr. Marshall was a public relations
consultant for the successful campaign for the adoption of the Missouri selection system
in Missouri in 1940); Farmer, Indiana Modernizes Its Courts, 54 JUDICATURE 327 (1971);
Heinicke, The ColoradoAmendment Story, 51 JUDICATURE 17 (1967); Henderson, Judicial
Reform Through Total Revision of State Constitutions, 51 JUDICATURE 347 (1968); Hoff,
Modern Courts for Vermont, 52 JUDICATURE 316 (1969); Paul, Selling Judicial Reform, 36
J. Am. JUD. SoC'Y 175 (1953); How To Conduct a Judicial Selection Reform Campaign,
36 J. Am. JUD. SOC'Y 4 (1952); Address by Henry T. Reath, Political Aspects of Judicial
Selection, Aug. 5, 1973 (delivered to a meeting on judicial selection sponsored by the
American Judicature Society and the American Bar Association at their joint annual
meeting).
149. The principles of the program suggested here can be applied to a variety of
judicial reform efforts.
150. Before the plan is developed it is imperative to analyze carefully the operation
of the existing judicial selection system. In the past, too little time has been spent on this
task. It is critical to establish a solid record of abuse before asking others to support a
plan for change. Among the better studies which have been made of existing selection
systems (not all critical) are: E. Bashful, The FloridaSupreme Court: A Study in Judicial
Selection (1958) (this study was part of the Studies in Government at the Bureau of
Government Research and Service of the School of Public Administration of Florida State
University, Tallahassee); C. Davis, JudicialSelection in West Virginia (1959) (a study for
the Bureau of Government Research of West Virginia University); B. Henderson and T.
Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas: An Exploration Study (1965) (this paper was
part of the Studies in Social Science of the Public Affairs Research Center of the University of Houston); Barber, Ohio JudicialElections-NonpartisanPremises with Partisan
Results, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762 (1971); Moos, JudicialElections and PartisanEndorsement
of Judicial Candidates in Minnesota, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 69 (1941); Seiler, Judicial
Selection in New Jersey, 5 SsrON HALL L. REV. 721 (1974).
LIC JOIN HANDS TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
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reform platform that they can all support. A certain amount of
compromise may be necessary to induce agreement, but it is imperative to begin the implementation fight firmly united. More
than one plan would only dilute the reform effort and would court
5
defeat even before the campaign began.' '
Once a specific proposal has been made, the first basic step
involves creating a campaign committee which may draw resources from the various reform groups, but whose only function
is the institutionalization of the reform plan. Since judicial reforms of this kind usually involve constitutional amendments
requiring ratification by a vote of the electorate, it is important
that this campaign committee not be dominated by lawyers, but,
rather, be broadly based and able to appeal to the widest possible
constituency.'52 The major task of this committee should be to
raise seed money and make a preliminary determination of the
probable over-all cost of the effort. If the costs are great, then the
effort should not be initiated until the necessary funds are available. In many instances a second-rate campaign could do more
harm than good to the cause of judicial selection reform.
If the committee decides that the campaign is feasible, it
should remove itself to an advisory and fundraising role and retain a professional management firm to run the campaign. Many
leaders of judicial reform campaigns in the past have felt that
their elections were special-turning on matters unique to the
particular issues and area-and should be run by local albeit
151. See, e.g., Ellis, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV., supra note 98, at 673-79; Goldstein, Judicial
Groups Split on Reform, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
In many states the existence of a plethora of judicial selection reform measures is a
reflection of differing perceptions of the selection problem by individuals from different
areas of the state. In New York, for example, the problems with judicial selection are not
the same in the Bronx as they are in Poughkeepsie or Watertown. One solution to this
problem may be some form of local option plan which would allow jurisdictions within
the state to adopt different selection plans under the umbrella of a general local option
constitutional amendment. This approach to judicial selection change, designed to unite
the disparate reform factions behind one general plan, has been successful in Kansas,
Indiana, and Arizona and is presently being advocated in Michigan, New York, and
Illinois. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975, at 55, col. 3; Interview with Edward J. Schoenbaum,
Director of Programs and Services for the American Judicature Society, in New York City,
Oct. 30, 1975.
152. Drew, JudicialImprovement in Florida in PROCEEDINGS, EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES 40 (1956) (the meeting was held in Dallas, Texas

and these Proceedings were published by The Council of State Governments); Winters,
Citizen Action-Key to Successful JudicialReform, 51 JUDICATURE 6 (1967). While appealing directly to the public, the committee might also attempt to have the appointing
authority voluntarily adopt the judicial selection reform proposal. See note 68 supra.
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inexperienced hands. However, the history of judicial selection
reform elections has shown the efforts in various jurisdictions to
have more similar than dissimilar qualities. ' It makes practical
sense, therefore, to seek professional assistance in those areas
where the expertise could be helpful. Such a step would not only
improve the administration of the campaign but would also allow
the committee extra time to concentrate on the uniquely local
aspects of the effort. Because of the costs involved in seeking such
professional help, it might be more efficient and effective for
judicial selection reform groups throughout the country to retain
one political consulting firm which would assist in the campaign
efforts in the various states.
Some might argue that utilizing such assistance hints of the
manipulation that is decried in the elective system. Manipulation, however, is hardly inherent in political processes. It is,
rather, the result of the methods used by some individuals in
approaching the system. This campaign must maintain the highest ethical standards, and it can be expected that the bar, the
judiciary, the opposition, and the press will quickly come to the
fore if there is any hint of political manipulation. The more germane question concerns the reasons why a campaign for such an
important issue should not utilize the best talents available.
Past efforts to reach the electorate on the issue of judicial
selection have been based on ill-conceived attempts to anticipate
public opinion and voter awareness about this subject. It is not
true, as many judicial reformers argue, that the electorate will
naturally support a non-elected judiciary. Most surveys indicate
that while the public knows very little about any process of judicial selection, the overwhelming majority of voters will nonetheless oppose an appointive system.15 4 These same surveys show,
153. See notes 146 & 148 supra.
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 1. This survey by Yankelovich,
Shelly and White, Inc. indicated that two-thirds of those polled in the New York City
metropolitan area opposed the appointment of judges.
When asked in a poll whether the Missouri plan would be a good way to select state
judges, Minnesota residents overwhelmingly responded to the negative. Now, as then,
Minnesota judges are chosen in nonpartisan elections. The Minnesota Poll, Minn. No.
265, question 14B, Mar. 1967 (data located at the Roper Public Opinion Research Center,
Williaristown, Massachusetts).
Unfortunately there has been very little thorough survey work done in the judicial
selection field. Much more quantitative data is needed to deal meaningfully with the
problem.
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however, that once informed about the issue, the public is much
more receptive to reform efforts. The committee therefore should
invest its initial funds in an in-depth background survey designed
to pinpoint public attitudes on the subject and discover voter
opinion on various approaches for change. Such a survey is absolutely crucial, for it will indicate in which areas and to which
groups and issues the campaign should be most vigorously directed. It is especially important to pinpoint the strengths and
weaknesses of an issue such as judicial selection reform which has
a strong potential to build coalitions across traditional political
lines. Properly conducted and utilized, the survey should provide
a guide for the conduct of the campaign. Since the campaign is
likely to be lengthy because of its substantial educational nature,
it may be wise to update the survey six months after the campaign has begun to determine the impact of the approach being
utilized."'

It is imperative that the matter not be placed on the ballot
before the public has been properly informed about the issue at
hand.1' It must be assumed that in any election of this sort there
is a significant built-in status quo vote which only the most vigorous educational campaign will be able to overcome. As Table II
indicates, public awareness of judicial affairs is not very high, and
if the reform issue is put to a vote before the electorate is made
aware of the established system's defects and the proposed sys15 7
tem's benefits, defeat will be likely.

155. A poll similar to (although much less extensive than) the one suggested here was
utilized in the successful judicial selection campaign in Arizona in 1974. This survey was
conducted before the campaign for the constitutional amendment began and found that
only 17 percent of the voters were familiar with the reform proposal (basically a Missouri
plan). When an explanation of the proposal was read to the voters, however, 51 percent
indicated that they favored such a plan, 34 percent opposed it and 15 percent had no
opinion. These and other findings in the poll indicated that the voters were receptive to
the reform proposal and indicated areas for the educational campaign to concentrate
upon. See Attitudes Toward Proposed Judicial Appointment Commission (PhoenixTucson), M.R. West Marketing Research Incorporated, Mar., 1974 (prepared for the State
Bar Association of Arizona).
156. It is also important that the issue appear on the ballot in a simple and nonprejudicial manner. In 1970 the Missouri plan was extended to St. Louis County, Missouri
by a vote of the electorate. The 1970 ballot allowed for a simple "yes" or "no" vote on
whether the plan should be implemented. In 1968, an identical measure was narrowly
defeated, and its failure was in large part blamed on the confusing and prejudicial way in
which the ballot was worded. The voters in 1968 were asked to choose between judges who
were "elected by the people" (i.e., retention of the elective system) and judges who were
"nominated by a commission and chosen by the Chief Executive of the State" (i.e., the
Missouri plan). St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 18, 1970, at 3a, col. 7.
157. See generally notes 146 & 148 supra; J. PELTASON, THE MIssouRI PLAN FOR SELECTION OF JUDGES

40, 53 (1945).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3

52

Dunn: Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals

Judicial Selection
Before going public, the campaign committee should make
an effort to meet with the various political leaders in the jurisdiction to ascertain their views on the proposed reform. The fact that
political leaders have a vested interest in the established system
does not necessarily mean that they will resist a change. Above
all, most politicians are rational, and many of them have decided
that judicial selection reform is good politics' 8 since it will lift the
task of selection from their shoulders-a job which often has as
many drawbacks as benefits.'59 Moreover, it is equally beneficial
to talk with those who do not favor the plan, since it is important
to identify, and possibly isolate, the opposition. Furthermore, it
may be possible to neutralize or later convert opposition leaders,
particularly if the committee is able to develop some political
strength in the leaders' districts.
As the balloting approaches, it is important that the educa-

tional effort and the organizational campaign work in tandem to
broaden the base of support for the reform. Too often in the past
such reform efforts have failed because during the campaign the
reformers talked to each other, rather than to the electorate. The
issues of judicial abuse and political chicanery potentially have
very strong public appeal since any citizen could be a victim of a
poor judiciary.'60 Properly tapped, this appeal could be translated
A proper educational campaign is an important element in the success of a judicial
selection reform campaign. The best approach is a simple and straightforward presentation explaining the defects of the current system and the attributes of the proposal. For
an example of such material see League of Women Voters of New York State, Judicial
Resource Kit: Selection of Judges (1965).
158. See, e.g., Report of the Governor-Elect's Task Force on Judicial Selection and
Court Reform, Dec. 23, 1974 (for Governor-Elect Carey of New York); Report of the 1972
Judicial Screening Committee of the New York County Democratic Party, July 21, 1972;
Lindsay, The Selection of Judges, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 514 (1966); Niles, supra note
11, at 242-43; Rosenman, supra note 68, at 90-92; 157 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1967, at 1, col.
6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 39, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 39, col. 7.
159. Niles, supra note 11, at 255.
160. The majority of voters would probably be willing to support and pass judicial
selection reform measures if the basic importance and personal relevance of the issues
were properly presented to them. See Winters & Lowe, supra note 59, § V (title page of
section, not numbered), quoting Glenn R. Winters:
Is it [judicial selection reform] worth it? For you, maybe not. Maybe you
are one of the considerable number of people who can live a lifetime and never
go to court for anything more serious than a traffic violation.
But when a uniformed officer rings your doorbell and hands you a paper
which says that the home you live in is not going to be yours any more, or when
the telephone rings at night and it is your son calling to say that he is in jail
charged with a crime that he knows nothing about, or when the other automobile
runs through the stop sign, smashes your car and puts you and your family in
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into important political strength. The final effort, of course,
should be to identify the supporters of the reform proposal and
encourage them to register their views on election day.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

While the legal community has long debated the issue of
judicial selection, little time has been expended rigorously analyzing the structure and consequences of the present methods of
selection.'' The controversy has instead tended to revolve around
heavily armed camps-either pro-election or pro-Missouri
plan-and the proponents of both groups have been hesitant to
examine critically the possible defects of their own systems for
fear of exposing a weak flank to the opponent. Both of these
established approaches have serious drawbacks. It is time now for
the creation and implementation of a new synthesis whereby the
best qualities of both plans are combined and strengthened to
develop a superior means of selection.
Reforming and improving judicial selection is not an easy
task. It is, however, an imperative one. As was once remarked to
William James, "[ihere is very little difference between one
man and another; but what little difference there is, is very
important."6 It is this difference which mandates the search for
an improved system of judicial selection. In the words of Professor
Rosenberg:' 63
[A]s hard as the task [of judicial selection] may be, there is a
special urgency for finding the human qualities in a judge that
are most promising and the flaws that are most damaging. More
than the teacher, the engineer, or the lawyer, the judge acts
directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his fellows. His
human frailties are perilously magnified by the nature of his
day-to-day work.
The proposal presented in this article is an effort to channel
the discussion of judicial selection into new areas, thereby stimulating the pursuit for the best method of choosing our judges. This
important task must go forward because society demands no less
than a system of judicial selection that will yield the very finest
judges.
Patrick Winston Dunn
the hospital, then suddenly the circuit court in your county, and the judge who
presides over it, become more important to you than anything else.
161. See, e.g., H. JACOB, JUsTICE IN AMERICA 206-07 (1965). "iT]he debate over judicial selection continues in a factual vacuum." Id. at 207.
162, W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BEUEVE 256 (1897).
163. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1064.
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APPENDIX I
These provisions of the Missouri
Constitution outline the basic features of the Missouri system of judicial selection. Mo. CONST. art. 5, §§
29(a), 29(c)(1), 29(d) (1970).
NONPARTISAN SELECTION OF JUDGES
§ 29(a).

Courts subject to plan-appointments to fill vacancies.

Section 29(a). Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of judge of any of the
following courts of this state, to wit: The supreme court, the court of appeals, the circuit
and probate courts within the city of St. Louis and Jackson county, and the St. Louis
courts of criminal correction, the governor shall fill such vacancy by appointing one of
three persons possessing the qualifications for such office, who shall be nominated and
whose names shall be submitted to the governor by a nonpartisan judicial commission
established and organized as hereinafter provided. If the governor fails to appoint any of
the nominees within sixty days after the list of nominees is submitted, the nonpartisan
judicial commission making the nomination shall appoint one of the nominees to fill the
vacancy.
§ 29(c)(1). Tenure of judges-declarations of candidacy-form of judicial ballot- rejection and retention.
Section 29(c)(1). Each judge appointed pursuant to the provisions of sections 29(a)(g) shall hold office for a term ending December thirty-first following the next general
election after the expiration of twelve months in the office. Any judge holding office, or
elected thereto, at the time of the election by which the provisions of sections 29(a)-(g)
become applicable to his office, shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office for the
term to which he would have been entitled had the provisions of sections 29(a)-(g) not
become applicable to his office. Not less than sixty days prior to the holding of the general
election next preceding the expiration of his term of office, any judge whose office is
subject to the provisions of sections 29(a)-(g) may file in the office of the secretary of state
a declaration of candidacy for election to succeed himself. If a declaration is not so filed
by any judge, the vacancy resulting from the expiration of his term of office shall be filled
by appointment as herein provided. If such declaration is filed, his name shall be submitted at said next general election to the voters eligible to vote within the state if his office
is that of judge of the supreme court, or within the geographic jurisdictional limit of the
district where he serves if his office is that of a judge of the court of appeals, or within
the geographic jurisdictional limit of his circuit if his office is that of circuit judge, or
within the geographic jurisdictional limit of his court, if his office is that of probate judge
or judge of the St. Louis court of criminal correction, on a separate judicial ballot, without
party designation, reading:
"Shall Judge .............................................
(Here the name of the judge shall be inserted)
of the ......................
........................
(Here the title of the court shall be inserted)
be retained in office?
Yes [
No QJ
(Mark an X in the box you prefer)"
If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retaining him in office, upon
the expiration of his term of office, a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled by appointment as provided in section 29(a); otherwise, said judge shall, unless removed for cause,
remain in office for the number of years after December thirty-first following such election
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as is provided for the full term of such office, and at the expiration of each such term shall
be eligible for retention in office by election in the manner here prescribed.
§ 29(d). Nonpartisan judicial commissions-number, qualifications, selection and terms
of members-majority rule-reimbursement of expenses-rules of supreme court.
Section 29(d). Nonpartisan judicial commissions whose duty it shall be to nominate
and submit to the governor names of persons for appointment as provided by sections
29(a)-(g) are hereby established and shall be organized on the following basis: For vacancies in the office of judge of the supreme court or of the court of appeals, there shall be
one such commission, to be known as "The Appellate Judicial Commission"; for vacancies
in the office of judge of any other court of record subject to the provisions of sections 29(a)(g), there shall be one such commission, to be known as "The ....................
Circuit Judicial Commission", for each judicial circuit which shall be subject to the
provisions of sections 29(a)-(g); the appellate judicial commission shall consist of a judge
of the supreme court selected by the members of the supreme court, and the remaining
members shall be chosen in the following manner: The members of the bar of this state
residing in each court of appeals district shall elect one of their number to serve as a
member of said commission, and the governor shall appoint one citizen, not a member of
the bar, from among the residents of each court of appeals district, to serve as a member
of said commission, and the members of the commission shall select one of their number
to serve as chairman; each circuit judicial commission shall consist of five members, one
of whom shall be the chief judge of the district of the court of appeals within which the
judicial circuit of such commission, or the major portion of the population of said circuit
is situated, and the remaining four members shall be chosen in the following manner: The
members of the bar of this state residing in the judicial circuit of such commission shall
elect two of their number to serve as members of said commission, and the governor shall
appoint two citizens, not members of the bar, from among the residents of said judicial
circuit to serve as members of said commission; the members of the commission shall
select one of their number to serve as chairman; and the terms of office of the members
of such commission shall be fixed by law, but no law shall increase or diminish the term
of any member then in office. No member of any such commission other than a judge shall
hold any public office, and no member shall hold any official position in a political party.
Every such commission may act only by the concurrence of a majority of its members.
The members of such commission shall receive no salary or other compensation for their
services as such, but they shall receive their necessary traveling and other expenses incurred, while actually engaged in the discharge of their official duties. All such commissions shall be administered, and all elections provided for under this section shall be held
and regulated, under such rules as the supreme court shall promulgate.
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APPENDIX V
The characteristics of nominating
commissions in states operating
under Missouri plans for judicial
selection.*
ALABAMA

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to interim vacancies
only. Thereafter, appointee must run in partisan election
at end of each term. Adopted ih 1950 in Jefferson County
and in 1974 in Madison County.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(2) Jefferson County Judicial Commission (Birmingham) 10th Judicial Circuit Court; Madison County Judicial Commission (Huntsville) 23rd Judicial Circuit Court
(6 year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

5 Members:
1 judicial-elected by judges of appropriate circuit,
2 Lawyers-elected by lawyer residents of appropriate judicial circuit-from list of nominees of appropriate bar
association,
2 non-lawyers-elected by state senator and representatives from appropriate county. All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits names only of 3 candidates (in no specific
order); no time constraints on submission thereof; names
of all applicants made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Members cannot hold public office, political office, or
be appointed to judicial office during term on commission; cannot serve 2 consecutive terms.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
ALASKA

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints to all vacancies. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of
each term. Initial term is 3 years + period to next general
election. Adopted in 1956.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) JudicialCouncil, Supreme Court (10 year term); Superior Courts (6 year term); District Court (4 year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

7 Members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Chairman),
3 lawyers-appointed by governing body of state's unified
bar,
3 non-lawyers-appointed by governor subject to legislative confirmation. All serve 6 year term.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits names only of 2 or more candidates 30 days of
vacancy; names of all applicants made public.

*The number listed in parentheses under the heading "Commission(s) & Judicial Offices
Encompassed" denotes the total number of nominating commissions in the state.
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RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Members cannot hold public office.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
ARIZONA
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints to all vacancies. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of
each term. Adopted in 1974.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(3) Appellate Court Commission, Appellate Courts;
Maricopa County Superior Court Commission, (Phoenix) Maricopa County Superior Court; Pima County Superior Court Commission (Tucson), Pima County Superior Court.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Appellate Court Commission-9 Members
Chief Justice (Chairman)
5 non-lawyers (each from different counties),
3 lawyers.
Maricopa County Superior Court Commission:
Same as Appellate except members must be residents of
Maricopa County.
Pima County Superior Court Commission:
Same as Appellate except members must be residents of
Pima County.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

The chief justice votes only in case of a tie. Voting done
by secret, written ballot. Commission nominates not less
than 3 persons, no more than 2 can be of the same political
party unless there are more than 4, in which case no more
than 60 percent of nominees can be of the same party.
Commission operates under rules that it adopts.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Lawyers must be selected by state bar, non-lawyer
members selected by the governor-both must be confirmed by the senate. Lawyers must have practiced in the
state for 4 years, lawyer and non-lawyer appointments are
required to be bipartisan. No member of the commission
can hold any government office for salary or profit; lawyers
cannot be considered for judicial nomination when on the
commission or one year thereafter.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Missouri selection process is mandatory for all counties
with population over 150,000; it is optional for all others.
COLORADO

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to vacancies in all
courts of record. Appointee serves provisional term of 2
years; therafter, must stand in retention election at end
of each term. Adopted in 1966.
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COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(23) Supreme Court Nominating Commission, Court
(10 year term), Court of Appeals (8 year term).
Judicial District Nominating Commissions (22) District
Courts (6 year term), Probate Courts (6 year term), Juvenile Courts (6 year term), Superior Court of Denver (6 year
term), County Courts outside of Denver (4 year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Supreme Court Nominating Commission-12 members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Chairman), 5 lawyers
(one from each congressional district)-elected by majority vote of governor, attorney general and chief justice, 5
non-lawyers (one from each congressional district) appointed by governor, 1 non-lawyer at large-appointed by
governor.
All serve 6 year terms.
Judicial District Nominating Commission-8 members:
Supreme Court Justice (Chairman), 3 lawyers*-elected
by majority vote of governor, attorney general and chief
justice, 4 non-lawyers (at least one from each county in the
appropriate judicial district)-appointed by governor.
All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Supreme Court Nominating Commission-Submits 3
candidates for an appellate vacancy and 2 or 3 for trial
vacancy within 30 days; name of appointee only made
public. The chairman of the several commissions do not
have a vote and only serve as ex officio members of their
respective commissions.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Supreme Court Nominating Commission-Members
cannot hold public or political party office, cannot serve
2 consecutive terms (terms are staggered), cannot be appointed to judicial office during their term and for 3 years
thereafter. No more than one-half plus one of members
(excluding chairman) can be of same political party.
Judicial District Nominating Commissions-No more
than 4 of 7 members can be of same political party.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

*Colorado Judicial District Nominating Commissionsin judicial districts having a population of 35,000 or less,
at least 4 members must be non-lawyers; the other members may be lawyers or non-lawyers, depending on majority vote of the governor, attorney general, and chief justice.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TYPE OF PLAN

Statutory, President appoints with Senate confirmation.
Automatic reappointment if Tenure Commission finds
"exceptionally well qualified" or "well qualified." If Tenure Commission finds "qualified," President has option to
resubmit for Senate confirmation. If Tenure Commission
finds "unqualified," appointee ineligible for reappointment. Adopted in 1973.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Commission, Court of Appeals
(15 year term), Superior Court (15 year term).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3

62

Dunn: Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals

Judicial Selection
SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

7 members:
Active or retired federal judge serving in the District
-appointed by Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, 1 lawyer or non-lawyerappointed by President of United States, 2 lawyersappointed by Board of Governors of the D.C. Unified
Bar, 2 members (one of whom may not be a lawyer)appointed by mayor, 1 non-lawyer-appointed by the
District Council. All serve 6 year terms except member
appointed by President, who serves a 5 year term.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submission of only 3 names within 30 days of vacancy.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office, except in the case
of the judicial appointee.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Senate confirmation of appointee. If President does not
or wishes not to appoint 1 of the 3 nominees within 60 days
of receipt of the list, the Commission is given the power
to nominate.

FLORIDA
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to interim vacancies
only. Thereafter, appointee must run in non-partisan election at end of term. Effective in 1973.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(24) Supreme Court Nominating Commission, Supreme
Court (6 year term).
District Courts of Appeal Nominating Commissions, (4)
Courts of Appeal (6 year term).
Judicial Circuit Nominating Commissions (20), Judicial
Circuit Courts (6 year term). Judges of County Court (4
year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Supreme Court Nominating Commission, District
Courts of Appeal Nominating Commissions and Judicial
Circuit Nominating Commissions-9 members: 3 lawyers-appointed by Board of Governors of Florida Bar, 3
electors-appointed by governor, 3 non-lawyers-elected
by majority vote of other commissioners. All serve 4 year
terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 or more names within 30 days; names of
nominees made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Members ineligible for appointment to judicial office
during term and 2 years thereafter.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Florida Federal Judicial Nominating Commission Chairman elected from membership of commission.
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GEORGIA
TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order, governor appoints to interim vacancies.
Thereafter, appointee must run in next general election.
Initially issued in 1971, issued with revisions in April,
1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Commission, Supreme Court
of Appeals, Superior Courts.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Judicial Nominating Commission-10 Members:
5 lawyers serve by virtue of office in the State Bar of Georgia,
5 citizens appointed by governor (no 2 from same circuit),
Non-lawyers serve for terms concurrent with the governor's term.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Judicial Nominating Commission submits 5 names to
governor; no time constraints.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP
SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
IDAHO
TYPE OF PLAN

Statutory, governor appoints to interim vacancies only.
Thereafter, appointee must run in nonpartisan election at
end of each term. Adopted in 1967.
Statutory, District Magistrate's Commission appoints for
term of 2 years. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of each term. Adopted in 1969.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(8) Judicial Council, Supreme Court (6 year term),
District Court (4 year term).
District MagistratesCommissions, Magistrates of District
Courts (2 year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Judicial Council-7 members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Chairman),
3 lawyers (including one district judge)-appointed by
Board of Commissioners of Idaho Bar, with consent of
senate,
3 non-lawyers-appointed by governor with consent of
senate.
All serve 6 year terms.
District Magistrates Commissions-5+ members:
2 lawyers-nominated by local bar association and appointed by Idaho State Bar,
3 mayors within appropriate district appointed by governor,
Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of
each county within the district.
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COMMISSION
OPERATION
RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Submits only 2-4 names to governor, names of nominees
only made public (at discretion of commission); no time
constraints.
Prohibited from holding public office. No more than 3
of 6 appointed members can be of same political party.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

INDIANA
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to initial term of 2
years. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of each term. Adopted in 1970.
Statutory, governor appoints certain county superior
court judges for initial term of 2 years. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of each
term. Adopted in 1971, 1972.
Statutory, governor appoints to initial term, and makes
subsequent reappointments at end of each term. Adopted
in 1972.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(5) Judicial Nominating Commission, Supreme Court
(10 year term), Court of Appeals (10 year term);
Lake County Superior Court Nominating Commission,
Lake County Superior Court;
Allen County Superior Court Nominating Commission,
Allen County Superior Court;
Vanderburgh County Superior Court Nominating
Commission, Vanderburgh County Superior Court (6 year
terms);
Marion County Municipal Court Nominating
Commission, Marion County Municipal Court (4 year
term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Judicial Nominating Commission-7 members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Chairman),
3 lawyers (1 from each court of appeals district) elected by
lawyer residents in each district,
3 non-lawyers (1 from each court of appeals district)appointed by governor. All serve 6 year terms (after
initial staggered terms of 2, 4, and 6 years).
Lake, Allen, and Vanderburgh County Superior Court:
Nominating Commissions-7 members,
1 judicial (Chairman)-appointed by Chief Justice of
Supreme Court,
3 lawyers-elected by lawyer residents of appropriate
county,
3 non-lawyers-appointed by governor. All serve 4 year
terms.
Marion County Municipal Court Nominating Commission-9 members:
1 judicial-appointed by Chief Judge of Court of Appeals,
2 lawyers-elected by local bar association,
2 non-lawyers appointed by mayor,
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2 non-lawyers appointed by governor,
1 lawyer appointed by Marion County Superior Court en
banc,
1 Circuit Judge (Secretary).
All serve 2 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Judicial Nominating Commission-Written evaluation on each of 3 nominees, based on considerations set out
in statutes, submitted to governor; if governor fails to
make an appointment within 60 days from the date the list
is submitted, then the chief justice makes the appointment from the same list; only name of nominees made
public (at discretion of commission).

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Judicial Nominating Commission-prohibited from
holding public or political party office;
Ineligible for judicial appointment during term and 3
years thereafter.
Lake, Allen, & Vanderburgh County Commissions-no
more than 2 of the 3 appointed members can be of same
political party.
Marion County Commission-no more than 1 of 2 mayorappointed members, the 2 governor-appointed members
and 2 bar-elected members can be of same political party.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
IOWA

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to initial term. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of
each term. Initial term is 12 months plus period to January 1 following next judicial election. Adopted in 1962.
Statutory, commission appoints judicial magistrates.
Implemented in 1973.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(113) State Judicial Nominating Commission, Supreme
Court (8 year term).
District Judicial Nominating Commissions (13) District
Courts (6 year term).
County Judicial Magistrate Appointing Commissions
(99), Judicial Magistrates (4 year term for full time, 2 year
term for part time).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

State Judicial Nominating Commission-12 members:
6 electors (1 from each congressional district) appointed
by governor with senate confirmation,
6 lawyer electors (1 from each congressional district)
elected by bar members of appropriate district. All serve
6 year terms.
District Judicial Nominating Commissions-li members:
1 district judge-appointed by chief judge of district,
5 electors-appointed by governor,
5 electors-elected by bar members of appropriate district.
All serve 6 year terms.
County Judicial Magistrate Appointing Commissions-6
members:
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1 judicial-appointed by chief judge of district,
2 lawyers-elected by appropriate county bar,
3 non-lawyers appointed by appropriate county board of
supervisors.
All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits in alphabetical order only names of 3 candidates for appellate vacancy or 2 for trial vacancy; only
names of nominees made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office, cannot serve 2
consecutive terms; ineligible for appointment to judicial
office during term on commission.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
KANSAS

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional, governor appoints to initial term. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of
each term. Initial term is 12 months + period to second
Monday in January after next general election. Adopted
in 1958.
Statutory, local option plan adopted in 1974.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(24) Supreme Court Nominating Commission, Supreme
Court (6 year term).
Judicial District Nominating Commissions (23), District
Courts.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Supreme Court Nominating Commission-ll members:
1 lawyer at large (Chairman)-elected by Kansas lawyers,
5 lawyers (1 from each congressional district) elected by
lawyers of appropriate district,
5 non-lawyers (1 from each congressional district) appointed by governor.
All serve 5 year terms.
Judicial District Nominating Commissions-lawyers
elected by the bar, non-lawyers appointed by county commissioners, number of members depends on number of
counties in district.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names within 60 days; only names of
nominees made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office, political party
office; cannot serve more than 2 terms; ineligible for
appointment to judicial office during term and 6 months
thereafter.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Judicial District Nominating Commissions: 23 of 29
judicial districts adopted plan by local referendum.

MARYLAND
TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order, governor appoints to interim vacancies
only. Issued in 1970, modified in 1974.
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COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(9) Appellate Courts Judicial Nominating Commission
Court of Appeals, Court of Special Appeals
Trial Court JudicialNominating Commission (8) District
Courts, Circuit Courts, Supreme Bench of Baltimore.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Appellate Courts Judicial Nominating Commission-13
members:
1 chairman, appointed by governor,
1 non-lawyer from each appellate judicial circuit, appointed by governor,
1 lawyer from each appellate judicial circuit, elected by
the bar,
1 secretary (the State Court Administrator) (non-voting).
Terms co-extensive with term of governor.
Trial Court Judicial Nominating Commission-13 members:
1 chairman, appointed by governor,
6 non-lawyers appointed by governor,
6 lawyers elected by bar,
Secretary (the State Court Administrator) (non-voting).

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits 5-7 names (these figures subject to several
exceptions including if an incumbent is seeking reappointment) only in alphabetical order; choices must be made
within 70 days; only names of nominees made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office; ineligible for
appointment to judicial office during term.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
MASSACHUSETTS
TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order, governor appoints. Issued in 1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Commission, all state courts.
Also nominates clerks of court for those courts for
governor has appointing responsibility.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

11 members appointed by governor: 5 lawyers (1 designated by Massachusetts Bar Association and 1 the dean
of a law school) and 6 non-lawyers.

COMMISSION
OPERATIONS

Recruiting and interviewing of potential nominees. List
of at least 3 nominees to be submitted to governor within
60 days after vacancy occurs. Governor may request additional list of at least 3 names. If appointee fails confirmation by Governor's Council, governor may request a third
list of at least 3 names.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

No member shall hold appointive or elective public
office during term. No more than 6 members shall be
registered members of the same political party at time of
appointment.
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3 year terms. No member to serve more than 2 successive terms. Public hearings to be held within jurisdiction
of local courts when vacancies occur therein. Names, records and deliberations held in confidence. Name of appointee publicly announced at least 14 days prior to consideration by Governor's Council.
MISSOURI

TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints to initial term. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at the
end of each term. Initial term is 12 months + period to
December 31 after next general election. Adopted by appellate courts and Jackson County in 1940. Adopted by St.
Louis county in 1970 and by Clay and Platt Counties in
1973.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(5) Appellate Judicial Commission, Supreme Court
(12 year term), Court of Appeals (12 year term).
Judicial Circuit Commissions, Circuit and Probate Courts
within St. Louis, Clay, Platt, and Jackson Counties (12
year terms), St. Louis Courts of Criminal Correction (12
year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Appellate Judicial Commission-7 members:
Supreme Court Justice-elected by members of Supreme Court,
3 lawyers, (1 from each court of appeals district) elected
by lawyer residents of appropriate district,
3 non-lawyers (1 from each court of appeals district) appointed by governor. All serve 6 year terms.
Judicial Circuit Commissions-5 members:
Chief Judge of District Court of Appeals,
2 lawyers-elected by lawyer residents of appropriate circuit,
2 non-lawyers, (1 from each circuit) appointed by governor. All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names (governor may request additional information); names of all applicants made public
(at discretion of commission); no time constraints.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Appellate Judicial Commission-prohibited from holding public office, political party office; cannot serve 2
consecutive terms.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
MONTANA
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints (with Senate confirmation) to interim vacancy only. Thereafter appointee must
run in nonpartisan election at next general election.
Adopted in 1972.
Statutory, adopted in 1973.
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COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) JudicialNomination Commission, Supreme Courts,
District Courts.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF
COMMISSIONERS

7 members:
District Judge-elected by district judges and certified
by supreme court,
2 lawyers (1 from each congressional district) appointed by
supreme court,
4 non-lawyers-appointed by governor. All serve 4 year
terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits 3-5 names only within 30 days; only names of
nominees made public (at discretion of governor).

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Ineligible for appointment to judicial office during terfi
and 1 year thereafter.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
NEBRASKA
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints. Thereafter, appointee'
must stand in retention election at end of each term. Initial term is 3 years plus period to next general election,
thereafter terms of 6 year duration. Adopted in 1962.
Amended in 1972.
Statutory, adopted in 1963, amended in 1973.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(51) Supreme Court Nominating Commissions (7),
Supreme Court (6 year term).
District Court Nominating Commissions (21), District
Courts (6 year term).
County Court Nominating Commissions** (21), County
Courts (6 year term).
Juvenile Court Nominating Commission, Juvenile Colifts
(6 year term).
Workman's Compensation Court Nominating Comiris-s
sion, Workman's Compensation Court.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

All commissions have 9 members:
Supreme Court justice (Chairman) appointed by governor,
4 lawyers-elected by lawyer residents of appropriate districts,
4 non-lawyers-appointed by governor.
All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits 2 or more names only (governor may request
additional information); no time constraints; only names
of nominees made public. Commission must hold public
meeting; chairman does not have a vote.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Cannot serve 2 consecutive terms nor more than 2
terms; ineligible for appointment to judicial office during term and 2 years thereafter. Supreme and District
Courts Nominating Commissions: No more than 2 of the
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4 governor appointed members nor more than 2 of the 4
lawyer elected members can be of same political party.
**Nebraska County Court Nominating Commissions
-in practice, the members serving on these commissions
often serve also on the corresponding District Court Nominating Commissions.
NEW YORK

TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order. Issued in 1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(62) Statewide Judicial Nominating Committee, Court
of Appeals, Court of Claims.
DepartmentalJudicial Nominating Committee, (4) Appellate Division, Supreme Court.
County JudicialNominating Committees, (57) Surrogate's Court, County Court, Family Court (outside
N.Y.C.).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Statewide Judicial Nominating Committee-12 members.
Chairman of each departmental committee + 2 others
from each departmental committee, 1 lawyer and 1 nonlawyer.
Departmental Judicial Nominating Committee-ll members:
4-at least 2 non-lawyers appointed by governor,
4-at least 2 non-lawyers appointed by chief judge,
1 lawyer appointed by presiding justices of appellate divisions,
2-at least 1 lawyer-appointed by majority and minority
leader of the assembly, Chairman appointed by governor.
County Judicial Nominating Committee-13 members:
Departmental Committee + 2 (1 lawyer and 1 non-lawyer)
appointed by a county's chief executive officer.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Report of the committee is available to public after
appointment is made.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Statewide Committee: the 2 members from each Departmental Committee must be of different political parties.
Departmental Committee: the 2 members appointed by
senate and assembly must be of different parties.
Of the 4 members appointed by governor and of the 4
appointed by chief judge, no more than 2 can be of same
political party.
County Committee: the 2 members appointed by county's
chief executive officer must be of different political parties. No member of a judicial nominating committee shall
hold any judicial, elected, public, or political office.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Statewide Committee-chairman is selected by committee. No limit on number of candidates submitted to governor.
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OKLAHOMA
TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order, governor appoints to interim vacancies
(trial courts). Issued in 1967.
Constitutional, governor and chief justice of supreme
court appoint. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of each term (appellate courts).
Adopted in 1967.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Commission, all judicial offices
within the state.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

13 members:
6 lawyers (1 from each congressional district) elected
by lawyer residents of appropriate district,
6 non-lawyers (1 from each congressional district) appointed by governor,
1 non-lawyer-elected by other commissioners.
All serve 6 year terms except member-at-large, who serves
2 year.term.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names; no time constraints; only names
of nominees made public; chairman is elected each year
by the commission members; governor bound to choose
from the commission nominations for supreme court and
criminal appellate courts, but is not thus bound for choosing trial court judges.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office, political party
office; cannot serve 2 consecutive terms; ineligible for
appointment to judicial office during term and 5 years
thereafter.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
PENNSYLVANIA
TYPE OF PLAN

Executive Order, governor appoints. Issued in 1973, modified in 1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(8) Appellate Court Nominating Commission,
Court, Superior Court, Commonwealth Court.
Trial Court Nominating Commission, composed
Judicial Nominating Commissions, Courts of
Pleas, Philadelphia Municipal Court, Traffic
Philadelphia.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Appellate Court Nominating Commission-7 members:
3 lawyers-appointed by governor,
3 non-lawyers-appointed by governor,
Senior supreme court justice who is ineligible for retention-appointed by governor (Chairman).
All serve 3 year terms.
Trial Court Nominating Commission:
3 area members,
1 lawyer, appointed by governor,
I non-lawyer appointed by governor,
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1 lawyer or non-lawyer as determined by governor, appointed by governor,
4 Judicial District Members,
2 lawyers from each judicial district,
2 non-lawyers from each judicial district.
All appointed by governor for 3 year term.
Chairman is appointed from area members by governor.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Appellate Commission: submits only 3 (may be fewer
upon majority vote of commission and prior approval
of governor) names within 30 days; only names of nominees made public.
Trial Commission: judicial district members only function
for appointments within their own judicial district.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding public office, political party
office; ineligible for appointment to judicial office during term on commission.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Commonwealth is divided into 7 judicial nomination
areas composed of judicial districts.

TYPE OF PLAN

Voluntary, committee of the state bar to make nonbinding recommendations to the appointing authority.
Committee established in 1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Committee, consults on all
judicial appointments made by the legislature or the
governor.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

Judicial Nominating Committee, 17 members:
9 non-lawyers appointed by the governor at the
request of the bar,
8 non-lawyers appointed by the president of the bar,
1 lawyer and non-lawyer from each of the 6 congressional
districts,
1 lawyer from the house and senate judiciary committees,
3 non-lawyers at large.
All serve 6 year terms, or until they cease to hold their
official positions.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

No more than 3 names may be submitted; these names
are made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Members of the committee are not eligible for nomination as a justice while on the committee or for 3
years thereafter, committee members may not succeed
themselves.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Members of the committee may not solicit individuals
for consideration by the committee for nomination.

SOUTH CAROLINA

TENNESSEE
TYPE OF PLAN

Statutory, governor appoints. Thereafter appointee must
stand in retention election at end of each term. Adopted
in 1971.
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COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Appellate Court Nominating Commission, Court
of Appeals, Court of Criminal Appeals (8 year term)
(not including supreme court).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

6 members:
3 members (1 resident from each grand division of
state-only 1 can be lawyer) appointed by governor,
3 lawyers (1 from each grand division of state) elected by
members of Tennessee bar.
All serve 6 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names within 30 days; names of all
applicants made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Members prohibited from holding public office, political party office; cannot hold office 2 consecutive terms;
ineligible for appointment to judicial office during term on
commission.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
UTAH
TYPE OF PLAN

Statutory, governor appoints to interim vacancies only.
Thereafter, appointee must run in next general election.
If no one files against him, then it is retention election.
Adopted in 1967, amended in 1969, 1971, and 1975.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(9) Supreme Court Nominating Commission, Supreme
Court;
DistrictCourt Nominating Commissions, District Courts;
Juvenile Court Nominating Commission, Juvenile Courts.

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

7 members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court (Chairman),
2 lawyers-selected by Utah State Bar Association,
2 non-lawyers-appointed by governor,
1 lawyer or non-lawyer-selected by senate,
1 lawyer or non-lawyer-selected by house of representatives.
All serve 4 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names within 45 days; only names of
nominees made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Cannot serve 2 consecutive terms; ineligible for appointment to judicial office during term and 6 months
thereafter; member selected by senate will be of governor's
political party, member selected by house will be of opposite party; successors shall be of opposite political parties
as predecessors; no more than 1 of 2 members appointed
by governor and bar can be of same political party.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS
VERMONT
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints to all vacancies, subject
to confirmation by senate. Adopted in 1974.
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COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Selection Board, Supreme Court (6 year
term), Superior Court (6 year term), District Court
(6 year term)

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

11 members:
3 lawyers-elected by lawyer residents of state,
2 non-lawyers-appointed by governor,
3 state senators (only 1 may be a lawyer) elected by senate,
3 state representatives (only 1 may be a lawyer) elected by
house of representatives.
All serve 2 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only the names of at least 3 persons qualified
to be appointed; if there should be 3 or fewer qualified
candidates, then board submits the names and may provide any amplifying information as appropriate; no time
constraints; name of appointee only made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

At least 1 of the 3 senators and 1 of the 3 representatives must be of political party which is in minority
in the senate and the house.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

WYOMING
TYPE OF PLAN

Constitutional,governor appoints to initial term of at least
1 year. Thereafter, appointee must stand in retention election at end of each term. Adopted in 1972.

COMMISSION(S) &
JUDICIAL OFFICES
ENCOMPASSED

(1) Judicial Nominating Commission, Supreme Court
(8 year term), District Courts (6 year term).

SELECTION &
TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS

7 members:
Chief Justice of Supreme Court or justice selected by
Chief Justice (Chairman),
3 lawyers elected by members of Wyoming bar,
3 non-lawyers appointed by governor.
All serve 4 year terms.

COMMISSION
OPERATION

Submits only 3 names within 60 days; only name of
appointee made public.

RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

Prohibited from holding political party office or public office; ineligible for appointment to judicial office
during term and 1 year thereafter. The 6 elected and appointed commissioners cannot succeed themselves.

SPECIAL
PROVISIONS

Before standing for retention election, candidate must
be reapproved by commission. (Currently an amendment
to the constitution is pending to remove this provision.)
The legislature can extend the plan to lower courts by
statute.
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APPENDIX VI
The present methods of judicial
selection in the states with the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
ALABAMA
Initial Selection:
All judges elected by partisan vote of electors within territorial jurisdiction of their
respective courts. ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 152.

Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Gubernatorial appointment (except in 10th and 23rd judicial circuits where a
Missouri selection plan is in effect). ALA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 153, 158, amends. 83,
110, 328; ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 386 (1974).

ALASKA
Initial Selection:
Missouri plan selection of supreme court justices and superior and district court
judges, appointed by governor from nominations made by judicial council. Magistrates are appointed by Presiding Judge of the Superior Court. ALASKA CONST. art.
4, §§ 5-8; ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.170 (1972).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. ALASKA CONST. art. 4, §§ 5-8; ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.15.170,
22.05.080 (1972).
ARIZONA
Initial Selection:
For superior court judges in counties with a population of less than 150,000-nonpartisan elections. Justices of the peace elected on partisan ballots; police magistrates elected in a manner determined by local charter or ordinance provision.
Court commissioners chosen by Presiding Judge of the Superior Court. All other
judges nominated by a non-partisan commission and appointed by the governor.
ARiz. CONST. art. 6, §§ 12, 36-38; Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-101, 12-120.01, 12213, 22-111, 22-403 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection except that if governor does not fill vacancy within 60 days
for superior court, court of appeals and supreme court, judges and justices or chief
justices of the supreme court will. Amz. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 12, 36-38; Aiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-120.01 (1974).
ARKANSAS
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § § 6, 17, 29, 38; ARK.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-409, 22-703, 22-810 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor for unexpired term until next general election. Interim
appointee may not run for office. ARK. CONsT. amends. 29 §§ 1, 2, 4, 5.
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CALIFORNIA
Initial Selection:
Supreme and appellate court judges are appointed by the governor and must be
confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. The governor has total
discretion in appointment of superior court judges and municipal judges. Justice
court judges are either elected or appointed, at the discretion of the respective
County Board of Supervisors. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16.

Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. Supreme and appellate court appointees fill out the
unexpired terms, superior court judges only serve until the next general election.
CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 7, 16.

COLORADO
Initial Selection:
Missouri plan selection of all judges of courts of record. CoLo. CONST. art. 6, §§ 20,

24-26.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor for all judges of courts of record from a list submitted by
the appellate or district nominating commission for a provisional 2 year term. CoLO.
CONsT. art. 6, §§ 20, 24-26.
CONNECTICUT
Initial Selection:
All judges of the supreme, superior, circuit, common pleas, and juvenile courts are
nominated by the governor and appointed by the general assembly. Probate judges
are elected on partisan ballots by electors in their respective districts. CONN. CONST.
art. 5, §§ 2, 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 9-218, 17-55, 45-5, 51-

142 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
All trial and appellate court judges nominated by governor and appointed by general assembly. When the legislature is not in session, the governor makes an appointment which lasts until the legislature reconvenes. Probate vacancies filled by
special election for the remainder of the term. CONN. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 3; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 4-19, 17-55, 9-218 (1975).

DELAWARE
Initial Selection:
All judicial offices filled through appointments by governor with confirmation by
senate; governor must reconvene senate if vacancy occurs during senate recess or
adjournment. DEL. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 30.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. DEL. CONST. art. 4 §§ 3, 30.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Initial Selection:
Appointment by the President of the United States, with confirmation by the
Senate of the United States from the list of persons recommended by the District
of Columbia Nomination Commission, for superior court and court of appeals.

District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, P.L.
93-198, §§ 431, 433, 434 (1974).
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Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. District of Columbia Self Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-198, §§ 431, 433, 434 (1974).
FLORIDA
Initial Selection:
All justices and judges shall be elected by vote of the qualified electors in a nonpartisan election within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. FLA.
CONsT. art. 5, §§ 10, 20(5)(6)(7); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.021, 105.041, 105.051,
105.071, 105.08, 105.09 (1973).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancy filled by gubernatorial appointment from a list of at least 3 candidates
nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating commission. Upon expiration of
original term, judicial election held to fill office. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 11.
GEORGIA
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all supreme court justices, judges of appellate and superior
courts, ordinaries, and justices of the peace; juvenile court judges are appointed
by superior court judge(s). GA. CONsT. art. 6, chs. 2-3703, 2-3708, 2-3802, 2-4203;
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1702, 24-2402, 24-2601, 24-2604, 24-4002 (1970).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor appoints all judges (except ordinaries, juvenile judges, and justices of
peace) under voluntary Missouri plan until next general election when remainder
of unexpired term is filled. Ordinaries and justice of the peace vacancies are filled
by special elections. Juvenile judges are appointed by superior court judge(s). GA.
CONST. art. 6, chs. 2-3703, 2-3708, 2-3803; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1707, 24-406, 24408, 24-2402, 24-2601, 24-2604, 24-4006 (1970).
HAWAII
Initial Selection:
All supreme and circuit court judges appointed by governor with advice and consent
of senate; 10 days public notice must be given by the governor before either sending
nominations to the senate br making interim appointments while senate is not in
session. District court judges are appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. Land court: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court designates 1st Circuit Court
Judges to serve as judge. Family court judge selected in same manner as land court
judge. HAWAII CoNsT. art. 5, § 3; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 501-2, 571-4, 601-6, 604-1,
604-2, 604-3 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. HAWAII CONsT. art. 5, § 3; HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 501-2,

571-4, 601-6, 604-1, 604-2, 604-3 (Supp. 1974).
IDAHO
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of supreme and district court judges. District court magistrates appointed on a nonpartisan Missouri plan basis by district court magistrates
commission. Actions of commission subject to approval by majority of district

judges in the district. IDAHO CONsT. art. 4, § 6; art. 5, §§ 6, 11, 19; art. 6, § 7; IDAHO
CODE §§ 1-2101, 1-2102, 1-2201 to 1-2207, 34-615, 34-616, 34-905, 34-1217 (Supp.
1975).
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Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor under a Missouri plan of supreme and district judges
from a list submitted by the judicial council, until next election. District magistrates appointed by commission for the unexpired term. IDAHO CONST. art. 4, § 6;
art. 5, § 19; IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2101, 1-2102, 1-2207, 59-904, 59-909 (Supp. 1975).
ILLINOIS
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of supreme court justices, appellate and circuit court judges.
Associate circuit judges are appointed by circuit judges and court of claims judges
are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. ILL. CONST.
art. 6, §§ 8, 12.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies in supreme court, appellate and circuit courts filled by appointment of
supreme court until next election more than 60 days after vacancy occurs; associate
circuit judges and court of claims vacancies filled in manner of original appointment. General assembly has authority to prescribe different method for filling
vacancies. ILL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 8, 12.
INDIANA
Initial Selection:
Justices of the supreme court, judges of the court of appeals, of the superior courts
of Lake, Allen and Vandenburgh Counties as well as the municipal court of Marion
County are appointed by the governor under a Missouri plan from names set forth
by an appropriate nomination commission. Judges of other circuit courts are
elected on a nonpartisan ballot by the electors of the area in which they serve. IND.
CONST. art. 7, §§ 3, 7, 9-11; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-301, 4-531, 4-534, 4-538, 4-927, 41928, 4-1932, 4-2995, 4-7801, 4-7806 (Bums 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies on supreme court, court of appeals, and superior courts of Lake, Allen,
and Vandenburgh Counties and Municipal Courts of Marion County are filled by
Missouri plan. Vacancies on other circuit courts are filled by regular gubernatorial
appointment. IND. CONST. art. 7, §§ 3, 7, 9-11; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-301, 4-537, 4538, 4-1927, 4-1928, 4-1932, 4-2995, 4-7801, 4-7806 (Bums 1974).
IOWA
Initial Selection:
Missouri plan selection of supreme and district court judges; full-time magistrates
are appointed by district judges from persons nominated by county judicial magistrate commission; part-time magistrates are appointed directly by the judicial
magistrate commission. IOWA CONsT. art. 5, §§ 15-17; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 602.18,
602.42, 602.50 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies in supreme and district courts filled by governor under Missouri plan.
Vacancies for district associate judges are not filled. Magistrates same as initial
selection. IowA CONsT. art. 5, §§ 15-17; IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.18, 602.30, 602.50
(1975).
KANSAS
Initial Selection:
Supreme court justices are appointed by governor under Missouri plan. All other
judges are chosen in popular election except in judicial districts where the electo-
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rate has adopted a Missouri plan for appointment of district court judges. KAN.
CONST. art. 3, §§ 2, 6-9, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-435, 20-2901 to 20-2913 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
For supreme court justices, same as initial selection. For all others, gubernatorial
appointment until next general election more than 30 days later except in some
districts via a Missouri plan if approved in that county. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2;
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-435, 20-2901 to 20-2913, 59-206 (1975).
KENTUCKY
Initial Selection:
Judges of court of appeals and circuit courts elected on nonpartisan ballots. All
other judges elected in partisan elections. Ky. CONST. §§ 99, 116, 129, 142, 148, 152,
160.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor until first general election 3 months after vacancy unless
unexpired term is less than 1 year, in which case appointment is for balance of term.
Ky. CONST. §§ 152, 160.
LOUISIANA
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges. LA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 7-9, 19, 22, 33, 47, 51, 82, 96.
Procedure for Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies are filled either by special election or appointment by the governor with
the advice and consent of the senate, depending on the length of the unexpired
term. LA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 7, 8, 21-23, 69.
MAINE
Initial Selection:
All judges appointed by governor with advice and consent of executive council
(seven-member body elected by the general assembly), except that probate judges
are chosen in partisan elections by electors of their respective counties. ME. CONST.
art. 5, pt. 1 § 8; art. 6, § 6; ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 157 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor fills all vacancies by appointment (probate judges' vacancies filled only
until the next election) with advice and consent of council. ME. CONST. art. 5, pt.
1, § 8; art. 6, § 6.
MARYLAND
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of the judges of the court of appeals, court of special appeals,
circuit courts, Supreme Bench of Baltimore, and orphans' courts. District judges
appointed by the governor using a voluntary Missouri selection plan with the advice
and consent of the senate. Tax court judges appointed by governor. MD. CONST. art.
4, §§ 3, 14, 14A, 21, 31, 40, 41D; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 224 (1975).
Proceduresfor Filling Vacancies:
All judicial vacancies except district court, orphans' court, and tax court vacancies
are filled by gubernatorial appointment under a voluntary Missouri selection plan
until next general election at least 1 year after appointment. Appointment for tax
court and orphans' court are for the remainder of the term to be filled. Vacancies
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in the district court are filled by the governor under a voluntary Missouri plan with
the advice and consent of the senate for a 10 year term. If the senate does not
confirm by end of annual legislative session, appointee leaves office and governor
must make another selection. MD. CONST. art. 4, §§ 5, 40, 41D; MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, § 224 (1975).
MASSACHUSETTS
InitialSelection:
All judges nominated and appointed by governor under voluntary Missouri plan
with the advice and consent of the governor's council (8 member body elected by
the voters). MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 2, § 1, art. 9; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, §
6 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancy:
Same as initial selection. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 2, § 1, art. 9.
MICHIGAN
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of all judges, including supreme court justices who are nominated by political parties. Judges of circuit and district court nominated in nonpartisan primary. District magistrates are appointed by district judges. All other judicial officers are nominated by nonpartisan nominating petitions. All incumbents
may file for reelection and need not be nominated to run. MICH. CONST. art. 6, §§
2, 8, 12, 16; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 168.325, 168.392, 168.395, 168.396, 168.426a,
168.464, 600.8204, 600.8501, 726.2, 728.3, 729.1 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Filled by general or special election. Governor fills vacancy in courts of record,
district, and common pleas courts until next general election. MICH. CONST. art. 6,
§ 23; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 168.325, 168.404, 168.409, 168.424, 168.444, 168.467,
726.5, 728.2, 729.3 (1975).
MINNESOTA
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election by electors of respective territorial jurisdiction. MINN. CONST.
art. 6, § 8; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 203.41, 205.05(2), 367.03, 487.03, 488.06, 525.04
(1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor until first general election at least 1 year after vacancy.
MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 11; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 488A.19 (1975).
MISSISSIPPI
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of supreme court, circuit court, chancery court, and county court
judges. Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145B, 153, 171; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-5-1, 9-7-1,
9-9-5, 21-23-3 (1972).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor of trial and appellate judges with advice and consent of
senate until next general election. If senate is not in session, governor's appointment expires at end of next session of senate unless appointee is confirmed. Miss.
CONST. art. 6, § 177; Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-29 (1972).
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MISSOURI
Initial Selection:
Missouri selection for judges of supreme court, courts of appeals, circuit, and probate courts of the City of St. Louis and Jackson, Clay, Platte and St. Louis Counties
and the municipal courts of Kansas City. All other judges elected on partisan
ballot. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(A)(b)(c)(1)(d); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 98.030, 98.500,
478.611, 481.110, 482.010 (1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Missouri selection for judges of supreme court, court of appeals, probate, and circuit courts of St. Louis, Clay, Platte, and Jackson Counties, and City of St. Louis
and Municipal Courts of Kansas City. Other vacancies filled by regular gubernatorial appointment. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(A)(b)(c)(1)(d).
MONTANA
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of supreme and district court judges. MONT. CONsT. art. 7,
§§ 5(1); 8; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4501, 93-401, 93-705 to 93-717 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme and district court vacancies filled under Missouri selection plan by gubernatorial appointment; MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 8. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11-721,
23-4501, 93-401, 93-705 to 93-717 (Supp. 1974).
NEBRASKA
Initial Selection:
Missouri selection of supreme court justices, district court judges, and county
judges. Associate county judges are appointed by county judges. NEB. CONsT. art.
5, § 21; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-504, 24-507, 24-802 to 24-811, 24-819, 24-822,
26-102, 32-535, 43-236.61, 43-230.05, 48-152, 48-152.61, 98-804 (Supp. 1973).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme court, district court, and county judge vacancies are filled under Missouri
selection plan. NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 21; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-516, 24-802 to 24811, 24-819 to 28-822, 26-102, 35-537, 48-804 (Supp. 1973).
NEVADA
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of supreme and district court judges. NEV. CONST. art. 6, §§
3, 5.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme and district court vacancies filled by governor until next general election.
NEv. CONsT. art. 17, § 22.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Initial Selection:
All judicial offices filled by nomination and appointment of governor with approval
of majority of the 5 member executive council (elected by the voters). N.H. CONsT.
pt. 2, arts. 46, 60.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 60, 73.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/3

82

Dunn: Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals

Judicial Selection
NEW JERSEY
Initial Selection:
Governor nominates and appoints judges with the advice and consent of the senate,
for supreme, superior, and county courts plus all judges of the inferior courts with
jurisdiction extending to more than 1 municipality. N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, pt. 1.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. N.J. CoNsT. art. 6, § 6, pt. 1.
NEW MEXICO
Initial Selection:
All judges are selected in partisan elections. N.M. CONST. art. 6, §§ 4, 12, 28.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies in supreme court, court of appeals, and district courts are filled by
gubernatorial appointment until next general election when a successor is elected
for the unexpired term. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 28.
NEW YORK
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of judges of court of appeals, supreme court, county court, surrogate courts, family courts other than in New York City, Civil Judges of the City
Court of New York City, district court judges, and justices of the peace. Governor
designates judges to sit on appellate division of the supreme court from among those
elected to the supreme court. Mayor of New York City appoints family court, city
court, and criminal division judges under voluntary merit plan. Governor appoints
court of claims judges with advice and consent of the senate. N.Y. CONsT. art. 6,
§§ 2(a), 4(c), 6(c), 8.10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17(d).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor fills vacancies in court of appeals, supreme court, county court, surrogate
courts, and family court outside New York City under voluntary Missouri plan until
next general election at least 3 months after vacancy occurs, at which election a
successor is elected for a full term. Court of claims vacancy filled in manner of
initial appointment for unexpired term. New York City court of criminal jurisdiction and family court vacancies filled in same manner as initial appointment for
full term. Board of supervisors fills vacancies in district court until next general
election at least 3 months after vacancy occurs when successor is chosen for a full
term. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §§ 2(c), 4(c), 8, 9, 21.
NORTH CAROLINA
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges except magistrates, who are appointed by the senior
regular resident superior court judge from each county from nominations submitted
by the clerk of the superior court of that county. N.C. CONST. art. 4, §§ 10, 16; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-10, 7A-16, 7A-45, 7A-140, 7A-171 (Supp. 1974).
Proceduresfor Filling Vacancies,
Governor fills vacancies in supreme court, court of appeals, superior court and
district court until next general assembly election. Magistrate vacancies filled for
remainder of term in same manner as initial selection. N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 19;
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-45, 7A-142, 7A-171 (Supp. 1974).
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NORTH DAKOTA
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of supreme court justices, district court judges, and county
court judges. N.D. CONST. art. 4, §§ 90, 104, 110, 112, 113.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme court justices are appointed by the governor until the next election. District court judges are appointed by the governor for the rest of the term. County
judge vacancies are filled by appointment by the county board of commissioners.
N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 78; art. 4, § 98.
OHIO
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of all judges. OHIO CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 3, 6.
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Same as initial selection. OHIO CONsT. art. 4, §§ 2, 3, 6.

OKLAHOMA
Initial Selection:
All judges of the supreme court and criminal appellate court are appointed under
a Missouri plan by the governor. Judges of the civil appellate court and of the
district courts are elected on a nonpartisan basis. Judges of the State Industrial
Commission are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
senate. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 3, 7-9; art. 7-8, §§ 1-5. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 122 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
All vacancies are filled by gubernatorial appointment under Missouri plan- supreme and criminal appellate courts by law, others voluntarily. OKLA. CONsT. art.
7 §§ 2, 3, 7-9; art. 7-B, §§ 3, 4; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 10; tit. 20, §§ 30.10, 122
(1974).

OREGON
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of supreme, circuit, district, and tax court judges and justices
of peace by electors of respective territorial jurisdiction. ORE. CONsT. art. 7, § 1;
ORE. Rav. STAT. §§ 252.010, 252.510 (1973).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Appointment by governor until next general election at least 20 days after vacancy
occurs. ORE. CONST. art. 5,

§

16; ORE. REv. STAT.

§ 51.260

(1973).

PENNSYLVANIA
InitialSelection:
Partisan election of all judges by electors of respective territorial jurisdiction. PA.
CONST. art. 5, §§ 13, 15; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 2, 111 (1962).

Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Voluntary Missouri plan for appellate and general trial court appointments; when

senate is in session at time vacancy occurs, approval of two-thirds of senate membership is needed for judicial appointments. PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 13, 15; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 115 (1962).
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RHODE ISLAND
Initial Selection:
Supreme court justices are chosen by both houses of the legislature in grand committee. Judges of the superior, district, and family courts are appointed by the
governor with the consent of the senate. R.I. CONST. art. 10, §§ 4, 5; R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 8-2-2, 8-10-11 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme court vacancies are filled by both houses in the legislature in grand committee until the next annual election by the legislature, of public officers when a
successor is chosen for a full term. In cases of vacancy in supreme court caused by
impeachment, temporary absence, or inability, position may be filled by the governor. All other vacancies filled in manner of initial selection. R.I. CONST. art. 10, §§
4, 5; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-2-2, 8-10-11 (Supp. 1974).
SOUTH CAROLINA
Initial Selection:
Supreme court justices, circuit court judges, and county judges are chosen by a vote
of the legislature; probate judges are chosen in partisan elections. S.C. CONST. art.

5, §§ 3, 9; S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 15-101, 15-217, 15-403, 15-404, 15-605, 15-1115,
15-1116 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Judicial vacancies are filled by the legislature. S.C. CONST. art. 5, §§ 3, 9, 14; S.C.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 15-101, 15-104, 15-407, 15-408, 15-410, 15-112 (Supp. 1974).
SOUTH DAKOTA
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan nomination and election of supreme, circuit, and county court judges.
S.D. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 7; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 16-9-2 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies in office of supreme and circuit courts filled by gubernatorial appointment for balance of unexpired term. County court judge vacancies are also filled
by gubernatorial appointment. S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 7; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 3-4-3 (1974).

TENNESSEE
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges except intermediate appellate court judges who are
chosen by a Missouri plan. TENN. CONST. art. 6, §§ 3, 4; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16401, 17-103, 17-701 to 17-716 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor fills appellate court vacancies by appointment of nominees of the nominating commission. Circuit court, chancery court, and county court judges are
elected. TENN. CONsT. art. 7, § 5; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-112, 17-113, 17-115, 17701 to 17-716, 19-115 (Supp. 1974).
TEXAS
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges. TEx. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 4, 6, 7, 15, 18.

Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Vacancies in office of judges of supreme court, courts of civil and criminal appeals,
and district court are filled by governor until next general election; vacancies in
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office of county judges and justices of the peace filled by commissioners court until
next general election. Tax. CONsT. art. 5. § 28.
UTAH
Initial Selection:
Supreme and district court judges are appointed under a Missouri plan, unless
candidates file for the particular position in which case there is an election. Juvenile judges similarly appointed, from nominees presented by statewide juvenile
court commission. UTAH CONST. art. 8, §§ 3, 6; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-7.1 to
20-1-16, 20-1-7.7, 20-1-7.8, 20-1-9, 55-10-69, 55-10-70 (Supp. 1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme and district court judges: gubernatorial appointment from a list of 3
candidates submitted by nominating commission until next general election for
state officers. Vacancies in juvenile court filled in same manner as initial selection.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-7.1 to 20-1-7.7, 26-1-16, 55-10-69, 55-10-70, 78-8-1 (Supp.
1975).
VERMONT
Initial Selection:
Supreme court justices, superior court judges, and district court justices are appointed under Missouri plan by the governor from a list of candidates submitted
by judicial selection board with the advice and consent of senate. Probate judges,
assistant judges, and justices of peace are elected in partisan elections. VT. CoNST.
ch. 2, §§ 32-34, 50-53; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 71, 111, 444, 601-605 (Supp. 1975).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor fills all vacancies by appointment. Appointment of judges to supreme,
superior, and district courts must be made from a list of candidates presented by
judicial selection board. VT. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 32-34; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 601605 (Supp. 1975).
VIRGINIA
Initial Selection:
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the circuit courts are chosen by majority
vote of the members of the General Assembly. District and county judges are chosen
by the General Assembly from a panel of 3 nominated by the circuit court judges.
Va. Const. art. 5, § 7, art. 6, § 7; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69 (1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
For vacancies in supreme and circuit courts, the governor, if the general assembly
is not in session, appoints; such appointee remains on the bench until a successor
is appointed by the reconvened legislature. District and county court vacancies are
filled in the same manner as initial selection. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
WASHINGTON
Initial Selection:
Nonpartisan election of all judges. WASH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 5, 10, 23; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.06.070, 2.24.010 (Supp. 1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme, appellate, and superior court vacancies are filled by governor until next
general election when a successor is elected for the unexpired term. WASH. CONST.
art. 4, §§ 3, 5, 10, 23; WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 2.06.08 (Supp. 1974).
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WEST VIRGINIA
Initial Selection:
Partisan election of all judges. W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, §§ 2, 5, 7; W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 3-1-17 (1971).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Governor fills vacancy in all judicial offices except county court by appointment
until next general election. If unexpired term is less than 2 years, appointment is
for remainder of the term. Vacancies in office of county court commissioner and
justice of the peace are filled by appointment by county court until next general
election. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, §§ 2, 5, 7; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-3 (1971).
WISCONSIN
Initial Selection:
Election of all judicial officers at nonpartisan election. Wis. CONST. art. 7, §§ 2, 4,
7,14; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.05 (1971).
Procedure for Filling Vacancies:
All vacancies filled by gubernatorial appointment until next judicial election, except that supreme court appointments are until next judicial election at which no
other justice is to be elected. Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 9; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.19, 17.21

(1971).
WYOMING
Initial Selection:
All judges of supreme and district courts are chosen by Missouri plan. County
judges are chosen by election. Wyo. CONsT. art. 5, § 4; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-114.13
(1974).
Procedurefor Filling Vacancies:
Supreme and district court judges same as initial selection; county judges appointed by county commissioners. Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 4; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
5-144.17 (1974).
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